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Abstract
This article addresses the corrosive interplay between the patent-based and the
sovereign- based systems of ownership of genetic material. In patent-based sys-
tems, genetic material is increasingly “owned” by corporations or research in-
stitutions which obtain patents over such material. In sovereign-based systems,
the national government owns or extensively controls such material. As more
patents issue for synthesized genes in developed countries through the patent sys-
tem, more raw genetic material is legally enclosed by the governments of devel-
oping nations, which house most of the world’s wild or raw genetic material. This
interactive spiral of increased enclosure results in the sub-optimal utilization, con-
servation and improvement of vital genetic material.
This article adds to the scholarship that critiques the patenting of genetic material
in the United States by focusing on the international collateral damage occasioned
by overbroad patenting in this area. In addition, it takes the first comprehensive
critical look at the sovereign-based system. It argues that sovereign ownership or
extensive control over genetic material (i) risks creating an anticommons in raw
genetic material (ii) threatens the liberty and autonomy of individuals and indige-
nous communities whose property contains such material and (iii) is premised on
a flawed approach in international law that has led to broad and unenforceable
regimes that will increase tensions between nations. Moreover, the interaction be-
tween the patent-based and the sovereign-based systems risks setting off a major
trade dispute under the TRIPS Agreement.
To repair this situation, I propose a framework for a more open system for ge-
netic material. I recommend that the United States take into account the adverse
reaction of other countries when determining as a utilitarian matter whether and,
if so, to what extent to allow patents for genetic material. Expansive patent rights
over genetic material can cause innovation in the biotechnology field to fall to
suboptimal levels because they cause sovereigns in the world’s most genetically
diverse nations to curtail access to the raw material that contributes to such in-
novation. For their part, genetically-rich developing countries should, inter alia,
adopt more selective and value-added approaches to enclosure.
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1 Briefly, the cells of all living things contain genes. Genes code for proteins, and proteins determine the struc-
ture and characteristics of life forms. MATT RIDLEY, GENOME 6–9 (1999). 
2 Jasemine Chambers, Patent Eligibility of Biotechnological Inventions in the United States, Europe and Japan: How
Much Patent Policy is Public Policy? 34 GEO. WASH. INT’L L. REV. 223, 237–39 (2002); Sean D. Murphy, Biotechnology
in International Law, 42 HARV. INT’L L.J. 47, 62–65 (2001); Lawrence Fisher, The Race to Cash in on the Genetic Code,
N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 29, 1999, §3, at 1. While a gene or a genetic sequence in its natural state cannot be patented,
a patent may issue if the naturally occurring gene is synthesized from its original state and ascribed a useful func-
tion. Linda J. Demaine & Aaron Xavier Fellmeth, Reinventing the Double Helix: A Novel and Nonobvious Reconcep-
tualization of the Biotechnology Patent, 55 STAN. L. REV. 303, 359 (2002). Patenting is discussed more fully in parts I and
V infra. 
3 Demaine & Fellmeth, supra note 2, at 359. “Over a sixth of these patents cover whole human genes and many
of their significant alleles.” Id.
4 Lyle Glowka, Bioprospecting, Alien Invasive Species, and Hydrothermal Vents: Three Emerging Legal Issues in the Con-
servation and Sustainable Use of Biodiversity, 13 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 329, 330–31 (2000) (reporting that ten nations
have passed such laws). Since Glowka’s article appeared, at least two other nations, Brazil and India, have put
access-restricting regimes into place. 
5 Id. at 331.
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HYPEROWNERSHIP IN A TIME OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL 
PROMISE: THE INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT TO CONTROL 
THE BUILDING BLOCKS OF LIFE
By Sabrina Safrin*
“Hyperownership” describes in a word the present international legal landscape with respect
to genetic material. At issue is who should own or control access to the subcellular genetic
sequences that direct the structure and characteristics of all living things, or, in popular usage,
nature’s or God’s blueprints for life.1 Traditionally, genetic material belonged to a global com-
mons or open system. No one exclusively owned this material and countries freely shared it.
In sharp contrast, today exclusive ownership and restrictions on the sharing of genetic material
are the international norm. 
This legal enclosure of genetic material has two components. First, developed countries, most
extensively and consequentially the United States, have pressed the reaches of the patent sys-
tem. They are extending patent protection to a wide and increasing array of genetic material.2
By mid-2000, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) had issued over six thousand pat-
ents on full-length genes isolated from living organisms and were considering over twenty thou-
sand gene-related patent applications.3 Second, in response to the privatization of genes through
the patent system, developing countries—which house most of the world’s wild or raw genetic
material—are pushing the boundaries of sovereignty. They are asserting sovereign ownership
or extensive national government control over a wide and increasing range of raw genetic mate-
rial in their countries. Since 1993, approximately twelve nations have passed laws that greatly
restrict access to raw genetic material within their borders.4 At least thirty others are in the pro-
cess of doing so.5
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6 See, e.g., MICHAEL F. BROWN, WHO OWNS NATIVE CULTURE? 138–39 (2003) (noting that the expansion of
patents in the area of biotechnology research eventually made it increasingly difficult for ethnobotanists to collect
wild plant specimens). The enclosure systems of developed and developing countries are not identical. Develop-
ing nations restrict access to raw or unimproved genetic material existing in the wild. Patents, in contrast, issue for
worked or improved genetic material. However, the amount of human improvement involved in a patented gene
can be rather small, consisting of isolating the gene and identifying its useful function. In this case, each system
encloses material either in or close to its natural state. 
7 See, e.g., Michael A. Heller & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Can Patents Deter Innovation? The Anticommons in Biomed-
ical Research, 280 SCIENCE 698 (1998); Arti K. Rai, The Information Revolution Reaches Pharmaceuticals: Balancing
Innovation Incentives, Cost, and Access in the Post-Genomics Era, 2001 U. ILL. L. REV. 173, 192–94; see also Demaine &
Fellmeth, supra note 2; Philippe Jacobs & Geertrui van Overwalle, Gene Patents: A Different Approach, 23 EUR. INTELL.
PROP. REV. 505 (2001) (arguing that patents should not be granted for DNA but only for downstream medical
goods). But see Eric Mauer, Comment, An Economic Justification for a Broad Interpretation of Patentable Subject Matter,
95 NW. U. L. REV. 1057, 1090 (2001). Others, while accepting the patent eligibility of isolated naturally occurring
genes, have proposed a series of mechanisms, such as a broader experimental use exemption and compulsory
licensing, to diminish the reach and innovation-inhibiting effects of such patents. Donna M. Gitter, International
Conflicts over Patenting Human DNA Sequences in the United States and the European Union: An Argument for Compul-
sory Licensing and A Fair-Use Exemption, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1623 (2001) (suggesting such mechanisms for human DNA
sequences); Molly A. Holman & Stephen R. Munzer, Intellectual Property Rights in Genes and Gene Fragments: A Regis-
tration Solution for Expressed Sequence Tags, 85 IOWA L. REV. 735 (2000) (proposing an ASCAP system for genes,
whereby all would have access to registered isolated and identified genes upon payment of a fixed fee); Janice M.
Mueller, No “Dilettante Affair”: Rethinking the Experimental Use Exception to Patent Infringement for Biomedical Research
Tools, 76 WASH. L. REV. 1 (2001). In contrast, some maintain that the system by and large is not broken and that
the United States should “steady the course.” Richard A. Epstein, Steady the Course: Property Rights in Genetic
Material 22–26 ( John M. Olin Law & Econ. Working Paper (2d ser.) No. 152, rev. Mar. 2003), available at <http://
www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html> (discussing and criticizing “middle of the road” proposals described
above and proposing an “all or nothing” approach where some genetic substances, like “express sequence tags,”
should be left in the public domain, but everything else should be governed by the usual rules of patent protec-
tion). But see Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Varying the Course in Patenting Genetic Material: A Counter-Proposal to
Richard Epstein’s Steady Course 1 (NYU Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper No. 59, Apr. 2003), avail-
able at <http://ssrn.com/abstract_id-394000> (disagreeing with Epstein). 
8 An anticommons can occur when multiple individuals or entities have rights of exclusion to a given resource.
See text at note 84 infra.
This article addresses the corrosive interplay between the patent-based and the sovereign-
based systems of ownership of genetic material. As more patents issue for synthesized genes,
more raw genes are legally enclosed by developing nations.6 This interactive spiral of increased
enclosure, or hyperownership, results in the suboptimal utilization, conservation, and improve-
ment of vital genetic material. It generates tensions between nations and threatens individuals
and indigenous communities. The global commons is being subjected to a global tug of war over
genetic material at the expense of the global common good.
Recently, a great deal of legal scholarship has been produced in the patent field questioning
aspects of the U.S. grant of patents to genes or genetic sequences.7 In criticizing or defending
the privatization of genes through the patent system, however, scholars have largely failed to take
into account the responsive and growing overseas phenomenon of sovereign ownership or
extensive sovereign control of naturally occurring genetic material. 
This article fills this lacuna by focusing on the international collateral damage occasioned
by overbroad patenting of genetic material in the United States. In addition, for the first time
in the legal literature, this article takes a comprehensive critical look at the sovereign-based sys-
tem. In particular, it argues that sovereign ownership or extensive sovereign control over genetic
material (1) risks creating an anticommons8 in raw genetic material, (2) threatens the liberty
and autonomy of individuals and indigenous communities whose property contains such mate-
rial, and (3) is premised on a flawed approach in international law that has led to broad and
unenforceable regimes that will increase tensions between nations. It concludes that collectively
the developed countries’ patent-based systems and the developing countries’ sovereign-based
systems have overreached in permitting or asserting ownership rights over genetic material.
While this article does not recommend a return to a comprehensive open system for genetic
material, it proposes a novel framework for reform that would move toward a more open sys-
tem. Such a framework would entail reciprocal, though not identical, steps by the United States,
on the one hand, and developing countries, on the other. With respect to the United States,
this article calls for an “international regarding” aspect to U.S. patent policy formulation in the
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art15
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9 The rules establishing how much and under what circumstances genetic material may be patented are pres-
ently being drawn and refined. Rebecca S. Eisenberg, How Can You Patent Genes? in WHO OWNS LIFE? 117 (David
Magnus, Arthur Caplan, & Glenn McGee eds., 2003) (although people have been obtaining patents on genetic
sequences for twenty years, the system is still struggling to clarify the ground rules for acquiring them).
10 Genetically rich countries and those engaged in international work under the auspices of the Convention
on Biological Diversity are currently determining and refining how much control sovereigns should assert over raw
genetic material. See Decision 26, Fifth Meeting of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention on Biological
Diversity, Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/5/26A (2000) (providing for the development of access and benefit-sharing
guidelines as a fall-back where countries lack “comprehensive legislation and national strategies for access and
benefit-sharing” and establishing two experts panels and one working group to develop such guidelines and
other measures to provide for access and benefit sharing). Such guidelines may also assist countries that are
developing access legislation. Both the Organization of African States and the Association of South East Asian
Nations have drafted model legislation on restricting access to raw genetic material. See part II infra, notes 108–16
and corresponding text.
11 Chambers, supra note 2, at 225 (the United States generates 75% of the world’s agricultural bioengineered
products alone). U.S. biotechnology is a $13 billion a year industry, and more than fourteen thousand biotech-
nology patent applications are filed in the United States each year. Id. at 224. 
12 Other developed countries, like the EU membership and Japan, while allowing the patenting of genetic mate-
rial, allow for the denial of such patents on public policy grounds. Id. at 232, 239; Gitter, supra note 7, at 1644–49.
They subject such patents to an experimental use exemption from infringement. Id. at 1689. On the whole, they
appear to apply a somewhat stricter standard for nonobviousness than the United States. Chambers, supra note 2,
at 241 (worldwide U.S. patent law provides the broadest protection of biotechnological innovations); Carlos M.
Correa, Internationalization of the Patent System and New Technologies, 20 WIS. INT’L L.J. 523, 530 n.40 (2002); Gitter,
supra, at 1677 (noting that European scholars and policymakers emphasize that the European criterion of an
inventive step might soon become impossible to meet for any DNA sequence as sequencing becomes increasingly
routine and obvious).
13 Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Art. 27, Annex 1C of Marrakesh Agree-
ment Establishing the World Trade Organization, Apr. 15, 1994, in WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION, THE LEGAL
TEXTS: THE RESULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND OF MULTILATERAL TRADE NEGOTIATIONS 321 (1999) [hereinafter
TRIPS]. For the proposition that the United States assumed the leadership role in pressing for the TRIPS Agreement
and the obligations that TRIPS places on countries to patent biotechnological inventions, see Frederick M. Abbott,
TRIPS in Seattle: The Not-So-Surprising Failure and the Future of the TRIPS Agenda, 18 BERK. J. INT’L L. 165, 168 (2000);
Murphy, supra note 2, at 68–69, 99; Kal Raustiala & David G. Victor, The Regime Complex for Plant Genetic Resources,
58 INT’L ORG. 277, 284 (2004).
14 There is an expansive body of literature exploring the moral issues raised by the patenting of genetic mate-
rial. See, e.g., LEON R. KASS, TOWARD A MORE NATURAL SCIENCE: BIOLOGY AND HUMAN AFFAIRS 149–50 (1985);
Gitter, supra note 7, at 1649–50 (summarizing moral objections to the patenting of genes); Mark J. Hanson,
Patenting Genes and Life: Improper Commodification? in WHO OWNS LIFE? supra note 9, at 161.
biotechnology field. By this I mean that the PTO, Congress, and/or the courts should take into
account, or “internationally regard,” the reaction of other countries, particularly developing
countries that are rich in genetic diversity, when determining as a utilitarian matter whether and,
if so, to what extent to allow patents for genetic material. With respect to genetically rich devel-
oping countries, this article proposes a set of steps to reduce sovereign enclosure of genetic mate-
rial. These steps include changing the international normative assumption about sovereign
enclosure of genetic material and more selective approaches to enclosure. These reforms are
possible because the patent system9 and the sovereign system10 are evolving. Opportunity exists
to influence line-drawing activity in both systems. 
Before I proceed, a few clarifying notes regarding the focus of this piece are appropriate. First,
this article focuses on the interplay between the patenting of genetic material in the United States
and the response to such patenting by developing countries that enjoy a wealth of genetic diver-
sity. While other developed countries, particularly members of the European Union and to a
lesser extent Japan, have permitted the patenting of genetic material and life forms, the United
States is the proverbial “thousand-pound gorilla” in this regard. It is the world’s largest producer
of bioengineered goods.11 It allows the patenting of genetic material to a greater degree than
any other country.12 Finally, the United States assumed the leadership role in pressing for the
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS Agreement), which
requires countries to extend patent protection to bioengineered goods with the potential impo-
sition of trade sanctions if they do not.13 The United States is the primary actor responded to
by other countries when it comes to the ownership of genetic material. Second, this article
approaches the issue of ownership over genetic material from a utilitarian rather than a moral
perspective.14 Third, it focuses on nonhuman genetic material. Discussion of human genetic
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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15 International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov. 23, 1983, Art. 1,
available at <http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/iu.htm> [hereinafter Undertaking]. Eight developed countries, includ-
ing the United States, expressed reservation to this language out of concern that it might conflict with intellectual
property protections that they were extending to plant breeders under the UPOV Convention, infra note 29. See
Raustiala & Victor, supra note 13, at 288; note 27 infra and corresponding text.
16 Edgar J. Asebey & Jill D. Kempenaar, Biodiversity Prospecting: Fulfilling the Mandate of the Biodiversity Convention,
28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 703, 718 (1995); Michael I. Jeffrey, Bioprospecting: Access to Genetic Resources and Benefit-
Sharing Under the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Bonn Guidelines, 6 SINGAPORE J. INT’L & COMP. L. 747,
758 (2002); John R. Adair, The Bioprospecting Question: Should the United States Charge Biotechnology Companies for
the Commercial Use of Public Wild Genetic Resources? 24 ECOLOGY L.Q. 131, 141 (1997) (noting that access to wild
genetic resources had traditionally been open); Cary Fowler, Protecting Farmer Innovation: The Convention on Bio-
logical Diversity and the Question of Origin, 41 JURIMETRICS 477, 480 (2001); Raustiala & Victor, supra note 13, at 284
(“For most of human history, the rule of common heritage governed [plant genetic resources].”).
17 PATRICIA W. BIRNIE & ALAN E. BOYLE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE ENVIRONMENT 141 (2d ed. 2002)
(qualifying that under international law, the use of global common property must be legitimate and reasonable).
18 Id. The concept of common property or a global commons in international law is similar to the concept of
a commons or public good in traditional property law. As Jeremy Waldron explains, a commons is an area or a
resource whose organizing premise is that it is available in principle for the use of every person. JEREMY WALDRON,
THE RIGHT TO PRIVATE PROPERTY 32 (1988). Typical examples include air, rainwater, public parks, and the
intangible resource of information in the public domain. 
material is included for the limited purposes of illustrating the reaches of the patent system and
flagging the implications for human genetic material of sovereign ownership or control of
nonhuman genetic material.
 Part I traces the roots of hyperownership of genetic material. It describes the shift in interna-
tional law and the laws of developed and developing countries from a global commons or open
system to the present system of extensive ownership rights. 
Part II takes a comprehensive critical look at the sovereign system. It argues that the sovereign-
based control regimes risk creating an anticommons in raw genetic material and threaten the
autonomy and liberty of individuals and indigenous communities whose property contains such
material.
Part III asserts that the international trend of granting sovereigns ownership or extensive con-
trol over genetic material is based on a flawed approach in international law that treats genes as
a tangible resource like oil when in fact they are more akin to an intangible resource like infor-
mation. It explains how this flawed approach leads to overbroad and unenforceable regimes that
increase tensions between nations.
Part IV argues for a more open system for genetic material and part V proposes a bilateral
framework for such a system.
I. THE SHIFT FROM AN OPEN SYSTEM TO ENCLOSURE OF GENETIC MATERIAL
In the Beginning: A Global Genetic Commons
The community of nations first spoke in a legal context about the ownership of genetic material
over twenty years ago. In 1983 approximately one hundred nations adopted the International
Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources (Undertaking), a nonbinding agreement negotiated
under the auspices of the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization. The Undertaking
reflected the traditional international paradigm that genetic material formed part of a global com-
mons. It began by stating that it “is based on the universally accepted principle that plant genetic
resources are a heritage of mankind and consequently should be available without restriction.”15
Although the Undertaking applied only to plant genetic resources, an area in which the con-
cept of a global genetic commons ran especially strong, all genetic material had traditionally been
viewed as part of a global commons.16
As part of a global commons, genetic resources were available in principle for the use of all
(often referred to as open access).17 As such, like information in the public domain, they were a
freely accessible good.18 Most important, as part of a global commons, genetic resources, like
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art15
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19 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 17, at 141. Although the terms are often used interchangeably, the concept of com-
mon property in international law should not be confused with the international law concept of the common heri-
tage of mankind. Id. at 143; KEMAL BASLAR, THE CONCEPT OF THE COMMON HERITAGE OF MANKIND IN INTERNA-
TIONAL LAW (1998). The “common heritage of mankind” is expressed in certain post–World War II international
treaties. These include the Agreement Governing the Activities of States on the Moon and Other Celestial Bodies
of 1979 and, most important, the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea of 1982. Scholars, drawing
on these two treaties, have identified five elements of the international common heritage of mankind: (1) exemp-
tion of the common area, such as the moon or the deep seabed and its resources, from appropriation by national
governments; (2) international management of the area or resource through an international authority; (3) the
sharing of benefits derived from the use of the area and its resources; (4) use of the area or resource solely for
peaceful purposes; and (5) an obligation to protect the area or resource for future generations. BASLAR, supra, at
209; BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra, at 143–44. The international concept of common property and the concept of inter-
national common heritage of mankind share the principle of nonsovereignty over the resource in question. They
differ, however, in that the concept of the common heritage of mankind envisions a strong international author-
ity to govern the resource. It also involves the sharing of the benefits of the property concerned by all states, even
if they are unable to participate in the actual extraction. Id. Despite sporadic use of the term “common heritage
of mankind” in FAO documents and other references related to the Undertaking, most scholars have concluded
or assumed that genetic resources were treated as international common property rather than common heritage
of mankind property. See, e.g., BASLAR, supra, at 307–10; see also note 16 supra. Genetic resources were not subject
to control by an international body or to international benefit-sharing arrangements.
20 Asebey & Kempenaar, supra note 16, at 719.
21 Id.; Jeffrey, supra note 16, at 758.
22 BIRNIE & BOYLE, supra note 17, at 141 (speaking about international common property in general and not
genetic material in particular). Once reduced to possession by taking, however, individual resources, such as a fish
caught on the high seas, could become property. Id.
23 Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303 (1980) (allowing a patent on a genetically engineered bacterium and
holding that patents could issue on living things). In 1985 the grant of a utility patent to genetically modified seed
was upheld. Ex parte Hibbard, 227 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 443 (Bd. Pat. App. & Interferences 1985); see also Pioneer Hi-
Bred Int’l, Inc. v. J.E.M. Agric. Supply, Inc., 200 F.3d 1274 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (patents may be granted to seeds and
seed-grown plants). In 1988 the first patent for a genetically modified animal was issued to Harvard University
for a mouse engineered for susceptibility to cancer, U.S. Patent No. 4,736,866.
24 Murphy, supra note 2. Under TRIPS, countries must extend patent protection for microorganisms. Parties
have discretion whether to grant patents to plants and animals. Most developed countries have extended patents
for plants and animals. Countries that have refused to extend patent protection to plants and animals include
Brazil, India, and Norway. See Correa, supra note 12, at 548; Emily Marden, The Neem Tree Patent: International Con-
flict over the Commodification of Life, 22 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 279, 293 (1999); The Complex Realities of Sharing
Genetic Assets, 392 NATURE 525 (1998); Colin Macilwain, When Rhetoric Hits Reality in Debate on Bioprospecting, 392
NATURE 535 (1998).
25 Amgen, Inc. v. Chugai Pharm. Co., 927 F.2d 1200 (Fed. Cir.), cert. denied sub nom. Genetics Inst. v. Amgen,
Inc., 502 U.S. 856 (1991); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Re-examining the Role of Patents in Appropriating the Value of DNA
the living resources of the high seas, were not subject to the sovereignty of or appropriation
by any state.19
In practice, the global genetic commons allowed researchers to collect samples of genetic
material freely, with two exceptions. The open system did not grant researchers and scientists
the right to trespass on private or state property to obtain genetic samples. Researchers had
to obtain any consent normally required before entering such property. Also, researchers would
pay collectors of such material for this kind of service.20 But they were not obligated to obtain
national government approval for sampling activities or to compensate the country where the
material was found.21 As a global commons resource, genetic material was not the exclusive pre-
serve of any single user or nation. No one commanded an exclusive right to prevent others from
exploiting the resource generally.22
The Expansion of Intellectual Property Rights over Genetic Material
The traditional paradigm that genetic resources formed part of a global commons was eroded
by the extension of patents to living organisms and later to genetic material.23 In most devel-
oped countries, patents now issue for microorganisms, genetically modified plants and animals,
and isolated and purified genes and genetic sequences.24 Patents will not be granted for genetic
material as found in nature, such as a gene while in a plant or a fish. A patent, however, can
be obtained when that gene has been removed and isolated, and a useful function for it iden-
tified.25 An isolated and purified gene does not exist in that form in nature. Thus, a patent could
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
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Sequences, 49 EMORY L.J. 783, 785–86 (2000); Murphy, supra note 2, at 64; Nicholas Thompson, Gene Blues,
WASH. MONTHLY, Apr. 2001, at 9. 
26 Eisenberg, supra note 25; Thompson, supra note 25.
27 The rise of intellectual property rights over plants evolved over time. For a thorough discussion of the rise
and expansion of these rights, see LAURENCE R. HELFER, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN PLANT VARIETIES:
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL REGIMES AND POLICY OPTIONS FOR NATIONAL GOVERNMENTS 14–21 (UN Food and Agri-
culture Organization, 2004); Raustiala & Victor, supra note 13, at 286–93.
28 FAO Res. 4/89, available at <http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/iu.htm>.
29 International Convention for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants, Dec. 2, 1961, as revised Oct. 23, 1978,
Arts. 5(1), 6(1), 33 UST 2703, available at <http://www.upov.int>. Member states are expected to grant and pro-
tect these rights at the national level.
30 UPOV Convention, supra note 29, as revised Mar. 19, 1991, Arts. 14(1), 14(5), 15(1)(iii), 15(2), S. TREATY DOC.
NO. 104-17 (1995), available at <http://www.upov.int>. Under the UPOV Convention, as revised in 1978, a farmer
could replant seeds from the crop produced by protected seeds for his own subsequent use, as well as exchange
seeds with other farmers without paying additional royalties to the breeder. The 1991 revisions no longer allowed
for the free exchange of seeds and imposed limitations on their replanting. HELFER, supra note 27, at 19. The
UPOV Convention, as revised in 1978, also allowed breeders to use a protected variety to create new varieties
without the prior authorization of the original breeder. The 1991 revisions, while recognizing this right, limited
it to new varieties that are not “essentially derived” from protected varieties. While this limitation was intended
to prevent second-generation breeders from making mere cosmetic changes in a protected variety, controversy
exists over the amount of genetic distance required before a second-generation variety does not “essentially derive”
from the first. The overall effect of the amendment has been to narrow the exemption and expand the rights of
first-generation breeders. Id. at 19.
31 Raustiala & Victor, supra note 13, at 287, 290. The TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, negotiated in the early
1990s and adopted in 1994, requires that biotechnological innovations, with certain exceptions, and plants receive
intellectual property protection.
32 Columbia University, School of International and Public Affairs, Access to Genetic Resources: An Evaluation
of the Development and Implementation of Recent Regulation and Access Agreements 3 (Environmental Policy
Studies Working Paper No. 4, 1999) (unpublished manuscript), available at <http://www.bionet-us.org> [herein-
after Columbia Access Paper]. Developed countries also destroyed much of their genetic diversity when they
destroyed natural habitats, such as forests, to make room for factories, homes, etc. 
issue for a gene that enables a flounder to resist frost, provided that the “inventor” has isolated
and purified that gene and identified its role in frost resistance. The ability to patent such genes
is significant because the holder of a patent on an isolated and purified gene can prevent all
others from making or using that gene.26
The traditional paradigm that genetic resources formed part of a global commons was also
adversely affected by the increased assertion and expansion of other forms of intellectual prop-
erty rights over plants, known as plant breeders’ rights.27 In 1989 certain developed countries
successfully pressed for the addition of Annex I28 to the Undertaking to make clear that the
Undertaking’s common heritage of mankind concept did not affect the rights of plant breeders
to exclude others from using their new and distinct varieties under the International Convention
for the Protection of New Varieties of Plants (UPOV Convention).29 Two years later, the UPOV
Convention was revised to expand these breeders’ rights by curtailing exceptions that had been
allowed for the free replanting, exchange, and use for breeding purposes of protected varieties
and their propagating material.30 These exceptions had reflected aspects of an open system
because they had allowed protected varieties to be used for a range of purposes without the orig-
inal breeders’ authorization. By the early 1990s, not only were biological goods subjected to a
range of intellectual property rights, but developing countries were facing pressure, particularly
from the United States, to extend intellectual property protection to such goods in their own
countries.31
Developing Countries Assert Sovereign Rights over Genetic Material 
In response to the patenting of plants, animals, and their genetic material, the expansion
of plant breeders’ rights, and the growing belief that raw genetic material might prove valuable,
developing countries sought to assert sovereign rights over such material. Developing countries
constitute most of the nations that hug the equatorial line where large numbers of different life
forms are concentrated.32 As a result, they harbor the greatest amount of the world’s genetic
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33 LILY LA TORRE LÓPEZ, ALL WE WANT IS TO LIVE IN PEACE 208 (Int’l Union for the Conservation of Nature
[IUCN], 1999) (90% of the world’s biodiversity is found in the tropical and subtropical regions of developing
countries); Macilwain, supra note 24; see also J. M. Spectar, Patent Necessity: Intellectual Property Dilemmas in the Biotech
Domain & Treatment Equity for Developing Countries, 24 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 227, 231 (2002) (stating that major centers
of genetic diversity or centers of origin of the world’s economically important crops are located in the tropics or
subtropics); Christopher Hunter, Comment, Sustainable Bioprospecting: Using Private Contracts and International Legal
Principles to Conserve Raw Medicinal Materials, 25 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. REV. 129, 131, 136 (1998) (approximately 50%
of all species reside in the tropical forests, including nearly half of the 250,000 species of the world’s higher plants).
34 BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING 23 (Walter V. Reid et al. eds., 1993). See generally Keith Aoki, Neocolonialism, Anti-
commons Property, and Biopiracy in the (Not-So-Brave) New World Order of International Intellectual Property Protection,
6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 11, 47 (1998) (summarizing the objections of Vandana Shiva, Ruth Gana [Okediji],
Rosemary Coombe, James Boyle, Jack Kloppenberg, and others who have written about the “Great Seed Rip-
off ” made possible by international conventions that allowed plant breeders to use traditional indigenous varie-
ties of seeds and “improve them” via minor genetic alterations without compensating the countries where those
seeds originated); James O. Odek, Bio-piracy: Creating Proprietary Rights in Plant Genetic Resources, 2 J. INTELL.
PROP. L. 141, 141 (1994) (explaining that developing countries now “passionately” protest the prospecting for
plant species in their tropical forests by scientists from multinational corporations who are “protecting their discov-
eries” through intellectual property rights. “To developing countries, these practices constitute uncompensated
exploitation of their ‘plant genetic resources’ in the name of intellectual property rights.”).
35 BIODIVERSITY PROSPECTING, supra note 34, at 23.
36 Statement of President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania, UN Doc. A/CONF. 151/26/Rev.1, at 36 (1993), quoted
in Craig D. Jacoby & Charles Weiss, Recognizing Property Rights in Traditional Biocultural Contribution, 16 STAN.
ENVTL. L.J. 74, 89 (1997).
37 FAO Res. 3/91, available at <http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/iu.htm>.
38 See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 13, at 288, 290 (core notion of the 1983 Undertaking was that no nation
owned plant genetic material).
39 Convention on Biological Diversity, June 5, 1992, Art. 15(1), 31 ILM 818, 823 (1992) [hereinafter CBD].
As of October 2004, 188 states had ratified or acceded to the Convention. The United States has signed but not
joined the Convention. Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity, at <http://www.biodiv.org> (last mod-
ified Oct. 12, 2004).
40 CBD, supra note 39, Art. 2.
41 Clare Shine & Palitha T. B. Kohona, The Convention on Biological Diversity: Bridging the Gap Between Conserva-
tion and Development, 1 RECIEL 278, 282 (1992). 
diversity.33 Why, these countries asked, should individuals and companies from gene-poor
developed countries obtain genetic material free of charge from gene-rich developing countries
when they then patent these genes and at times sell them back to the country where the genetic
material originated?34 Should not such material be treated like oil or coal for which source countries
receive compensation?35 As the president of Tanzania said, “[M]ost of us in developing countries
find it difficult to accept the notion that biodiversity should [flow freely to industrial countries]
while the flow of biological products from the industrial countries is patented, expensive and
considered the private property of the firms that produce them. This asymmetry . . . is unjust.”36
Consequently, developing countries began taking steps to enclose raw genetic material. At
the end of 1991, they successfully pressed for the adoption of Annex III to the Undertaking. The
annex stated that the Undertaking’s heritage of mankind concept was “subject to sovereignty
of the states over their plant genetic resources” and that “nations have sovereign rights over their
plant genetic resources.”37 This assertion of sovereign rights over raw genetic material repre-
sented the death knell of the core concept of a global commons, namely, that sovereigns would
not claim or appropriate something in that commons as exclusively their own.38
By 1992, the concept of a global commons or open system for genetic resources had been rele-
gated to a coffin. At the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio de Janeiro, nations hammered the nails into
this coffin. The Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD or Convention), adopted at that sum-
mit, begins its discussion of genetic resources by proclaiming not the common heritage of such
resources but, rather, the sovereignty of nations over them.39 Article 15(1) of the Convention states,
“Recognizing the sovereign rights of States over their natural resources, the authority to deter-
mine access to genetic resources rests with the national governments and is subject to national
legislation.” The Convention broadly defines “genetic resources” as “any material of plant, ani-
mal, microbial or other origin containing functional units of heredity” of “actual or potential
value.”40 Although earlier proposals had employed the “common heritage of mankind” lan-
guage, most developing countries emphatically rejected such language.41 Consequently, the
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42 CBD, supra note 39, pmbl.
43 The existence of sovereign rights over a nation’s territory, including its natural resources, is a fairly well
established principle in international law. Carlos M. Correa, Sovereign and Property Rights over Plant Genetic
Resources 2 (Background Study Paper, Comm’n on Plant Genetic Resources) (1994) (citing Resolution 1803 of the
UN General Assembly, UN GAOR, 17th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at 15, UN Doc. A/5217 (1962), which provides in
paragraph 3 that due care should be taken “to ensure that there is no impairment, for any reason, of the State’s
sovereignty over its natural wealth and resources”). Each nation has the authority to regulate extraction of its natural
resources. Christopher D. Stone, What to Do About Biodiversity: Property Rights, Public Goods, and the Earth’s Biological
Riches, 68 S. CAL. L. REV. 577, 602 n.63 (1995) (citing GA Res. 3281, UN GAOR, 29th Sess., Supp. No. 31, at 50,
UN Doc. A/9631 (1974); GA Res. 3171, UN GAOR, 28th Sess., Supp. No. 30, at 52, UN Doc. A/9030 (1973); GA
Res. 1803, supra).
44 CBD, supra note 39, Art. 15(2).
45 See generally Aoki, supra note 34, at 49. 
46 See generally Correa, supra note 12 (many developing countries, like Brazil, have explicitly excluded existing
biological materials from patentability unless they are genetically altered). The furor over a patent application on
a cell line cultivated from a Guayami woman’s blood illustrates this objection. In the early 1990s, U.S. researchers
took blood samples from members of the Guayami tribe to check for a propensity for hairy-cell leukemia. In 1991
researchers applied for a patent on a cultivated cell line, identifying Dr. Jonathan Kaplan as the “inventor” of
the cell line. When news of the application reached the press, indigenous communities were outraged. Aoki, supra
note 34, at 53.
47 Assurances by some that the patenting of genes isolated from an individual or a plant or animal does not
preclude those donors from using their own genes provide little comfort. See, e.g., Eisenberg, supra note 9. If any-
thing, these assurances appear to highlight the breadth of the taking as the patent holder apparently enjoys the
right to exclude uses of the patented gene, with the exception of its biological action in the host’s body.
48 VANDANA SHIVA, BIOPIRACY: THE PLUNDER OF NATURE AND KNOWLEDGE 2 (1997). Although made in the con-
text of objecting to the TRIPS Agreement, these statements reflect the general views of activists and many developing
countries on the relationship between intellectual property rights and raw materials taken from those countries.
49 Id. at 3.
50 For a general discussion, see Andrew Pollack, Patenting Life: A Special Report: Biological Products Raise Genetic
Ownership Issues, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 26, 1999, at A1. See also Peter Drahos, Biotech Patents, Markets and Morality, 21
EUR. INTELL. PROP. REV. 441, 442–43 (1999). The expansion of patent protection to an increasing array of genetic
material and biotechnological innovations has resulted not only from the acceleration of such activity in the United
States, but also from the internationalization of some of these protections through the TRIPS Agreement. Under
Article 27 of the TRIPS Agreement, supra note 13, member states of the World Trade Organization must extend
patent protection to biotechnological innovations. While countries need not extend patent protection to plants,
they must provide for a sui generis system that offers some intellectual property protection for plants. Raustiala &
Victor, supra note 13, at 292, note that throughout the TRIPS review process, “developing countries, sometimes
joined by the EU, sought to limit the scope of protection for improved plant genetic resources but the United States
generally sought the widest possible ambit for intellectual property protection.”
preamble to the Convention pointedly refers to genetic resources as the “common concern”
rather than the “common heritage” of humankind.42
The Convention on Biological Diversity, after acknowledging sovereign rights43 over genetic
resources, requires parties to “endeavour to create conditions to facilitate access” to such resources.44
The trend of genetically rich countries, however, has been the opposite: to restrict and encum-
ber access to raw genetic material within their borders, largely in response to the increased pat-
enting of genetic material and bioengineered goods since the conclusion of the CBD.45 These
countries particularly object to developed countries’ granting of patents to genes isolated from
material that was taken from or originated in developing countries.46 They view such patenting
as colonial-style taking or theft.47 As activist Vandana Shiva states: “The freedom that transnational
corporations are claiming through intellectual property rights protection . . . is the freedom
that European colonizers have claimed since 1492.”48 Colonization, the taking of minerals, tim-
ber, and other resources from the developing world, has “now been extended to the interior spaces,
the ‘genetic codes’ of life-forms from microbes and plants to animals, including humans.”49
Thus, as corporations from developed countries, particularly the United States, increasingly
obtain patents over genetic material and biotechnological innovations,50 developing countries
increasingly enclose their raw genetic material.
In addition, the environmental community has encouraged developing countries to pass
legislation restricting access to genetic material. Environmentalists hope that making money
from genes will give developing countries’ governments an incentive to preserve threatened natural
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51 See generally Raustiala & Victor, supra note 13, at 289; Christopher D. Stone, New Issues for a New Century: Land
Use, Biodiversity, and Ecosystem Integrity, 27 ECOLOGY L.Q. 967, 991–92 (2001) (describing approach aimed at achiev-
ing conservation by solidifying the property interests of the nation in which the resource originated). 
52 See Raustiala & Victor, supra note 13, at 293; see also Naomi Roht-Arriaza, Of Seeds and Shamans: The Appropri-
ation of the Scientific and Technical Knowledge of Indigenous and Local Communities, 17 MICH. J. INT’L L. 919, 927 (1996)
(to achieve fair and equitable benefit sharing for the use of biological resources and the conservation of biological
diversity, the CBD “vests sovereign rights” to genetic resources in the state). The CBD represents the principal
international forum for the definition of rules pertaining to access to and benefit sharing of genetic resources.
The Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), by Resolution 7/93, renegotiated the International Undertaking
on Plant Genetic Resources to “harmonize” it with the CBD. See the home page of the Undertaking, <http://www.
fao.org/ag/cgrfa/iu.htm>.
53 Raustiala & Victor, supra note 13, at 290. The International Union for the Conservation of Nature, for example,
prepared a guide outlining basic elements for a draft access and benefit-sharing system for use by governments in
drafting access and benefit-sharing legislation. LYLE GLOWKA, A GUIDE TO DESIGNING LEGAL FRAMEWORKS TO
DETERMINE ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES (IUCN Envt’l Pol’y & Law Paper No. 34, 1998). This guide was used
by the Andean Pact nations of Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela in developing their common access
regime. Achim Seiler & Graham Dutfield, Regulating Access and Benefit Sharing: Basic Issues, Legal Instruments,
Policy Proposals, Doc. UNEP/CBD/WG–ABS/1/INF/4, at 69 (2001), available at <http://www.biodiv.org/doc/meetings/
abs/abswg-01/information/abswg-01-inf-04-en.pdf>. 
54 See supra notes 4, 5 and corresponding text. 
55 Andean Pact, Common System on Access to Genetic Resources, Decision 391 ( July 2, 1996), available at <http://
www.comunidadandina.org/ingles/treaties/dec/d391e.htm> [hereinafter Common System].
56 Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32, at 34. Colombia, in particular, is said to account for 10% of the world’s
terrestrial species of plants and animals.
57 For example, Peru served as cochair of one of the CBD sub–working groups of the Access and Benefit Sharing
Working Group. Venezuela served as chair of the negotiating group for the International Treaty on Plant Genetic
Resources for Food and Agriculture, Nov. 3, 2001, available at <http://www.fao.org/ag/cgrfa/itpgr.htm> [herein-
after PGR Treaty]. 
58 For example, Colombia insisted for many years that the PGR Treaty govern access not only to genetic
resources, but also, as does the Common System, supra note 55, Arts. 1, 2, access to derivatives of such resources
habitats and biological diversity.51 In this way, gene-laden threatened species can essentially pay
their own way to continued survival.
Today, the appropriateness of national government ownership or extensive national control
over raw genetic material to achieve compensation or “benefit sharing” represents the prevail-
ing perspective in international law.52 Article 15(7) of the CBD specifies that access to genetic
resources shall be gained only with the “prior informed consent of the Contracting Party pro-
viding such resources,” unless that country provides otherwise. As a result, international work
on implementation of the CBD includes model legislation prescribing sovereign ownership or
extensive control over genetic resources.53 As stated earlier, since the adoption of the CBD, over
forty nations have passed or are in the process of passing laws that greatly restrict access to raw
genetic material within their borders.54
What are these sovereign-based access-restricting regimes? How do they work? They tend to be
lengthy, complex, and varied. In the main, they declare or regard genetic resources as national
patrimony. As such, these resources essentially belong to the national government or at least are
subject to extensive national government control. Before considering the problems raised by
such regimes, analysis of two influential access-restricting regimes—that of the Andean com-
munity (an early regime) and that of India (a recent one)—may convey the flavor of how such
regimes operate.
Andean common system on access to genetic resources. One of the most important and influential
regimes restricting access to raw genetic material is the regional Common System on Access
to Genetic Resources (Common System) promulgated by the Andean Pact nations of Bolivia,
Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, and Venezuela.55 Together these five countries may “harbor the larg-
est proportion of the world’s biological diversity.”56 In addition, they play a significant role at
international negotiations addressing access to genetic resources issues.57 Consistently with their
own practice, at international meetings these nations advocate comprehensive legislative regimes
to restrict access to genetic material, demand international funding for the development of such
regimes, and seek to incorporate aspects of the Common System into international agreements
or resolutions addressing access to genetic resources issues.58 Moreover, as one of the earliest
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(i.e., the molecular products of gene expression). The CBD’s access and benefit-sharing provisions do not extend
to units as small as a molecule, which does not contain “functional units of heredity.” Including such derivatives
would substantially increase restrictions on access to genetic material. See Seiler & Dutfield, supra note 53, at 70.
59 The Andean Pact adopted the Common System in 1996, a mere three years after the entry into force of the
CBD. For the influence of the Common System, see for example, UGANDA WILDLIFE SOCIETY AND ENVIRONMEN-
TAL LAW INSTITUTE, LEGAL AND INSTITUTIONAL OPTIONS FOR GOVERNING ACCESS TO GENETIC RESOURCES IN
UGANDA 10–11, 29 (Environmental Law Institute, 1999) (citing the Andean Pact regime as a potential model in
certain respects for Uganda’s regulations on access and benefit sharing). The Andean model has also been included
in virtually all case studies on access and benefit-sharing legislation. 
60 Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32, at 39 (the Common System “grants ownership of genetic resources
and derivatives to the member nation or state”). Common System, supra note 55, Art. 6 (“The genetic resources
and their byproducts which originated in the Member Countries are goods belonging to or the heritage of the
Nation . . . as stipulated in their respective national legislation.”). The Colombian legislature declared that “genetic
resources . . . belong to the nation, as they are part of the natural resources or riches.” Columbia Access Paper,
supra, at 40.
61 Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32, at 40; see infra note 65.
62 See Common System, supra note 55, Arts. 3, 6.
63 Id.
64 Common System, supra note 55, Arts. 1, 3, 6. Article 2 of the CBD, supra note 39, defines “in-situ conditions”
as “conditions where genetic resources exist within ecosystems and natural habitats, and in the case of domes-
ticated or cultivated species, in the surroundings where they have developed their distinctive properties.” Article 1 of
the Common System largely mimics this definition.
65 Common System, supra note 55, Art. 6; Seiler & Dutfield, supra note 53, at 74. The Common System dis-
tinguishes between biological resources, which contain genetic resources, and genetic resources. Consistently with
this approach, Article 14 of the Common System provides that the system shall not impede the use and free move-
ment of biological resources, such as fish, plants, or fauna, within the Andean area, “provided that there is no access
to the genetic resources contained in the biological resources.” Similarly, the fourth complementary provision,
adopted by the Andean Pact, requires that certain exports of biological resources bear the inscription “Use of this
product as a genetic resource is not authorized.” KERRY TEN KATE & SARAH A. LAIRD, THE COMMERCIAL USE OF
BIODIVERSITY 33 n.1 (1999). Moreover, the State does not claim ownership to the knowledge of indigenous com-
munities associated with genetic resources, such as knowledge relating to the healing property of plants. Common
System, supra, Art. 7.
66 Common System, supra note 55, Art. 7; Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32, at 39–40.
67 Common System, supra note 55, Art. 17; Seiler & Dutfield, supra note 53, at 70–71, 73.
68 Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32, at 39; Seiler & Dutfield, supra note 53, at 71.
69 Seiler & Dutfield, supra note 53, at 70–71. To obtain this consent, the researcher must provide the national
government with all information concerning the genetic resource at issue, including its actual and potential uses,
its derivatives, and the risks that could arise from accessing it. Id. at 70. The applicant need not provide this infor-
mation to any other stakeholder. Id. The Common System does provide for “accessory” contracts between researchers
attempts to restrict access to genetic material, the Common System has influenced other access
regimes.59
Under the Common System, ownership of raw genetic material and derivatives of such genetic
resources, such as molecules, effectively vests with the nation-state, i.e., the national government
(hereinafter the State), rather than with the individual or indigenous community whose land or
property houses the relevant genetic resource.60 Under the Common System, the State either
expressly owns or exercises virtually complete control over such resources.61 The State also osten-
sibly owns the genetic material of migratory species, such as migrating birds, in their territories.62
State ownership applies to genetic material for which the states are countries of origin.63 Under
the Common System, this classification broadly includes material found in situ (i.e., in natural
habitats) in that country, as well as material taken from in situ sources in that country and main-
tained ex situ, such as in museums, zoos, and collections of plant germ plasm.64 
Although the State effectively owns all nonhuman genetic material in its territory, the Common
System provides that such ownership is without prejudice to the ownership of the biological
resource or land containing the genetic material.65 Thus, while a person in Colombia might own
a plant or cow, the national government owns the genetic makeup of that plant or cow.66 To
access genetic material (a practice referred to as “bioprospecting”) within an Andean Pact
country, a researcher or institution must obtain the consent of the national government and enter
into an agreement prescribing benefits to be received by that country for the accessed mate-
rial.67 Only the State can authorize such access.68 Only the State is a party to the benefit-sharing
agreement with the bioprospector.69 The Common System applies not only to foreigners seeking
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and the owners or administrators of the property on which the bioprospecting is to take place. Id. at 71. These
contracts, however, are subject to the agreement between the State and the researcher. Id.
70 Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32, at 43.
71 Biological Diversity Act, 2002, No. 18, Feb. 5, 2003, available at <http://envfor.nic.in/divisions/biodiv/act/
bio_div_act.htm>.
72 This refers to any person who is not a resident citizen of India. Id. §3(2).
73 Foreign corporation refers to any “body corporate, association or organization . . . not incorporated or
registered in India” or “which has any non-Indian participation in its share capital or management.” Id.
74 “Biological resource” broadly encompasses “plants, animals and micro-organisms or parts thereof, their
genetic material and by-products . . . with actual or potential use or value.” Id. §2(c). Biological resources do not
include “products which may contain portions or extracts of plants and animals in unrecognizable and physically
inseparable form.” Id. §2(c), (p).
75 Id. §3(1). “Commercial utilization” refers to end uses of biological resources for commercial purposes, such as
for drugs, food flavors, cosmetics, colors, and “genes used for improving crops and livestock through genetic
intervention.” Id. §2(f).
76 Id. §3. The National Biodiversity Authority is a national interagency body. Id. §8. 
77 The Biological Diversity Act, supra note 71, §22, authorizes states within India to create state biodiversity
boards. These boards may regulate, prohibit, and restrict the “commercial utilization,” “bio-survey,” and “bio-
utilization” of any biological resource by Indians, but not by foreigners. The Biological Diversity Act, §§7, 24,
requires Indian resident citizens and Indian corporations to give “prior intimation” (undefined but seems to
mean prior notification) to the state biodiversity board before engaging in such activities. They need not, however,
obtain the approval of the National Biodiversity Authority before engaging in such activities.
78 Id. §§4, 19(1).
79 Id. §20(1).
80 Id. §21. The law refrains from requiring the payment of royalties or fees in all cases. It does, however, consis-
tently mention such royalties and fees in connection with bioprospecting approval, ostensibly assuming that the
National Biodiversity Authority will usually require such payments. Id. §§6(2), 19(1), 19(3), 20(3).
81 Id. §21(3).
82 Id. §41(2). India’s law requires that every local municipality create a biodiversity management committee.
Id. §§41(1), 2(h). These local committees may levy collection fees from any person accessing or collecting biolog-
ical resources from areas within their territorial jurisdiction. Id. §41(3). The National Biodiversity Authority must
notify the public of any of its approvals. Id. §§19(4), 20(4).
access to genetic resources in an Andean Pact country, but also to Andean Pact nationals and
local institutions.70
India. In December of 2002, India passed comprehensive legislation restricting access to
genetic material in its territory.71 India’s law broadly prohibits any foreign person72 or foreign
corporation73 from “obtain[ing] any biological resource74 occurring in India or knowledge asso-
ciated thereto” for research, survey, or commercial utilization75 without the prior approval of
India’s National Biodiversity Authority.76 Regulation of bioprospecting by Indian resident citizens
and Indian corporations is left to subnational (state) biodiversity boards and appears less restric-
tive.77 The statute further prohibits any foreign person or corporation from “transfer[ring] the
results of any research relating to biological resources occurring in, or obtained from, India”
without the prior approval of the National Biodiversity Authority.78 Moreover, even if the National
Biodiversity Authority approves the obtainment or transfer of any such resource or information,
the applicant may not subsequently transfer that resource or information without the authority’s
consent.79
The law, in turn, requires the National Biodiversity Authority to secure equitable benefit shar-
ing for the use of “accessed biological resources, their by-products, . . . and knowledge relating
thereto.”80 Where a biological resource or associated knowledge has been acquired from a specific
individual, group, or organization, the authority may, but need not, direct payment of moneys
collected to such individuals, groups, or organizations.81 The law does not require bioprospectors
to obtain the consent of affected individuals or groups before obtaining biological resources. How-
ever, the National Biodiversity Authority must consult with specially created local committees
when making decisions “relating to the use of biological resources” and associated knowledge.82
Finally, the law prohibits any person, whether foreign or Indian, from applying for any intel-
lectual property right in or outside India “for any invention based on any research or information
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83 Id. §6(1).
84 Michael A. Heller, The Tragedy of the Anticommons: Property in the Transition from Marx to Markets, 111 HARV.
L. REV. 621, 622 (1998).
85 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243, 1244–45 (1968). In addition to depleted
fisheries, traditional examples of this tragedy include air pollution, overgrazed fields, the extinction of species,
and marine pollution.
86 Heller, supra note 84, at 622, 677.
87 Id. at 677.
88 Id. at 622–23.
89 Id. at 623.
90 Id. 
on a biological resource obtained from India” without the prior approval of the National Bio-
diversity Authority.83
II. RISKS POSED BY SOVEREIGN OWNERSHIP OR CONTROL OF GENETIC MATERIAL
Most access-restricting regimes are breathtaking and unprecedented in scope. They purport
to cover the export of all nonhuman living things and the parts of all nonhuman living things
down to the genetic and, in some cases, molecular level. Some, like the regimes of the Andean
Pact nations, Brazil, and to a lesser extent India, even control the domestic use of raw genetic
material. Nations, lured by the prospect of becoming a genetic Saudi Arabia, promulgate these
regimes in an attempt to capture monetary and other benefits. 
These increasingly popular national access-restricting regimes pose two risks. First, they risk
creating an anticommons in raw genetic material. Second, they risk infringing on the auton-
omy and interests of individuals and indigenous communities whose land or property contains
the genetic material to which the sovereign stakes claim. A seemingly irreconcilable tension exists
between an access-restricting regime that protects the interests of all potential stakeholders
(individuals, local communities, the State, and even interested civil society) and a regime that
avoids an anticommons by limiting the number of involved stakeholders and thereby facilitates
access to genetic material and benefit sharing. I predict that national government and inter-
national work on access and benefit sharing will face the difficult task of choosing between pro-
tecting the interests of all stakeholders and providing economic remuneration to the nation-
state. Furthermore, this tension will probably become more severe as nations and international
organizations eventually grapple with the issue of access to the human genome.
The Anticommons Trap
What is an anticommons? Michael Heller, introducing the concept, explains an anticommons
property “as the mirror image of commons property.”84 A tragedy of the commons exists when
too many individuals have the right to use a scarce resource, such as fisheries, and overuse that
resource potentially to its complete depletion.85 An anticommons can occur when too many indi-
viduals or entities have rights of exclusion to a given resource.86 A tragedy of the anticommons
arises when these individuals or entities employ their rights to veto the use of a given resource
and in so doing waste the resource by its underconsumption compared with a social optimum.87
Both tragedies represent “group action” problems in economic terms. 
Heller points to unused storefronts in Moscow as an example of an anticommons tragedy.
In the 1990s, as the former Soviet Union made the transition to a free-market economy, previ-
ously state-owned stores remained empty, “while flimsy metal kiosks, stocked full of goods, mush-
roomed up on Moscow streets.”88 Why? Heller explains that transition regimes “failed to endow
any individual with a bundle of rights” representing “full ownership of storefronts or other
scarce resources.”89 They gave a broad assortment of stakeholders, including private or quasi-
private enterprises, workers’ collectives, and local, regional, and federal governments, rights to
prevent the use of a storefront.90 As a result, entrepreneurs preferred to sell their wares on the
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91 Id. at 625.
92 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 7 (pointing to anticommons problems in basic medical research); Rai, supra
note 7, at 192–94 (upstream patents in biotechnology can deter innovation).
93 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 7, at 698; Rai, supra note 7, at 192–94.
94 Ostensibly to spur and support the biotechnology industry, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office has adopted
a fairly generous approach to granting patents in the biotechnology area. It has granted patents for gene discov-
eries that border new useful technologies, traditionally eligible for the patent grant, and basic research results,
traditionally precluded from the patent grant. Id. 
95 See generally Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. REV. 1575, 1611 (2003)
(summarizing effects of an anticommons).
96 Id. 
97 John Doll, 280 SCIENCE 700 (1998); John P. Walsh, Ashish Arora, & Wesley M. Cohen, Work Through the
Patent Problem, 299 SCIENCE 1021 (2003) (concluding that strong patent protection in the area of research tools has
rarely thwarted innovation); see also Arti K. Rai & Rebecca S. Eisenberg, The Public Domain: Bayh-Dole Reform and
the Progress of Biomedicine, 66 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 297 n.47 (2003) (discussing patent thicket but that
companies’ response has been to put things into the public domain); Epstein, supra note 7, at 20. But see Burk
& Lemley, supra note 95 (concluding that the biotech industry is particularly susceptible to anticommons problems).
98 TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note 65, at 19; see Philippines Exec. Order No. 247 (May 18, 1995), available at
<http://law.nus.edu.sg/apcel/dbase/filipino/primary.html>.
99 The bioprospecting applicant must first submit a letter of intent along with a research proposal and a filing
fee to the national Inter-Agency Committee on Biological and Genetic Resources (IACBGR). The IACBGR is a
national regulatory body established under section 6 of the executive order to enforce and implement its provi-
sions. If the research proposal passes an initial screening by the committee’s Technical Secretariat, the applicant
street rather than undertake the burdensome and uncertain task of obtaining the consent of
all stakeholders. As Heller notes, the Russian government did not intentionally create an anti-
commons. However, by giving too many individuals and entities property rights and decision-
making authority over the use of a given resource, it unwittingly created an anticommons
tragedy.91
Scholars identify another anticommons tragedy in the proliferation of patent rights in the
United States on basic discoveries in the biotechnology field.92 Patent claims are currently staked
to upstream research results, such as the isolation and identification of genetic sequences, that
traditionally would have been made freely available as part of the public domain.93 Consequently,
a broad range of upstream patent holders over early biomedical and genetic research results
can prevent others from developing downstream medical treatments and therapeutics that build
upon these results.94 In this anticommons environment of fragmented property rights, pro-
ceeding with a particular gene therapy or downstream bioengineered good entails high search
and negotiation costs to locate and bargain with the many rights owners whose permissions are
necessary to complete broader development.95 In addition, a single holdout can completely sty-
mie a project.96 The tragedy is that upstream research results are underutilized and downstream
medical treatments, therapeutics, and other potentially helpful goods remain undeveloped.
Not all agree that an anticommons exists or risks emerging in the biotechnology field.97 Nev-
ertheless, it may be emerging in a related and to-date largely uncontroversial area of govern-
ment restriction of access to genetic material. Multiple ownership interests or rights of exclusion
in raw genetic material risk creating an anticommons. For example, let us imagine that Grandma
owns a petunia plant, but the government owns the plant’s genetic makeup. In addition, Grandma’s
local community holds a stake in the plant’s genetic makeup because many members of the
community have similar petunia plants on their windowsills. If each of these stakeholders has
the right to prevent the extraction of the petunia’s genes, it will be extremely difficult and costly
to access and utilize that material.
There are signs that access-restricting legislation that legitimately tries to protect the inter-
ests of all parties is creating an anticommons problem. One example is the Philippines access-
restricting regime, with its multiple consent requirements. This regime broadly encompasses
all “research, collection and utilisation of biological genetic resources” within the Philippines
“for purposes of applying the knowledge derived therefrom for scientific or commercial pur-
poses.”98 Navigating the regime is arduous. It requires the bioprospector to go through multiple
layers of national government review and consent.99 In addition, the bioprospecting applicant
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submits, inter alia, a formal application, an institutional profile, an environmental impact assessment, and a pro-
cessing fee. After the IACBGR considers the project and the benefit-sharing agreement, it submits its recommen-
dation to yet another government agency for approval or disapproval. Upon approval of the application, the appli-
cant pays a bioprospecting fee as determined by the IACBGR. TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note 65, at 30.
100 Id. at 28 (citing Exec. Order No. 247, supra note 98, §2); Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32, at 57.
Section 2.1(w) of the Philippine Implementing Rules and Regulations defines prior informed consent as 
the consent obtained by the applicant from the Local Community, IP [Indigenous Cultural Communities
or Indigenous Peoples], PAMB [Protected Area Management Board] or Private Land Owner concerned, after
disclosing fully the intent and scope of the bioprospecting activity, in a language and process understandable
to the community, and before any bioprospecting activity is undertaken.
Philippines Dep’t of Env’t & Nat. Res., Admin. Order No. 20 ( July 9, 1996), available at <http://law.nus.edu.sg/
apcel/dbase/filipino/regs/phrbio.html> [hereinafter Phil. Regulations].
101 Phil. Regulations, supra note 100, §§6.1.3, 7.1. Appropriate local authority refers to “Indigenous Cultural
Communities or Indigenous Peoples,” municipal or city mayor of the local government unit, or Protected Area
Management Board. Id. §2.1(w).
102 Id. §§2.1(w), 6.1.3, 7.1.
103 Id. §7.2.1. 
104 Id. §7.2.2. The applicant then submits the signed prior informed consent certificate(s) and proof of public
notification and sector consultation to the Technical Secretariat. Id. §7.3. The Technical Secretariat evaluates
the application and documents and submits its evaluation to the full IACBGR. Id.
105 Exec. Order No. 247, supra note 98, §5(e); WILLIAM LESSER, SUSTAINABLE USE OF GENETIC RESOURCES UNDER
THE CONVENTION ON BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY: EXPLORING ACCESS AND BENEFIT SHARING ISSUES 57 (1998).
106 Foreign applicants must agree to conduct research in collaboration with Philippine scientists from Philip-
pine institutions, Phil. Regulations, supra note 100, §8.1.12. Applicants must also make technologies developed from
research on Philippine endemic species available royalty-free for commercial and local uses to the national govern-
ment, id. §8.1.9, and make available commercial products derived from Philippine resources to the national govern-
ment and local communities concerned, id. §8.1.13.
107 Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32, at 55.
108 OAU, African Model Legislation for the Protection of the Rights of Local Communities, Farmers and Breed-
ers, and for the Regulation of Access to Biological Materials (2000), available at <http://www.grain.org> [hereinafter
OAU Model Legislation]; Seiler & Dutfield, supra note 54, at 88. This regional model will become or influence
the law of some, if not many, of the OAU member states.
109 OAU Model Legislation, supra note 108, Art. 5(1).
110 Id. 
111 Id., Art. 8 (1)(iv). Other requirements include, inter alia, depositing duplicates of biological specimens along
with complete field information with designated governmental agencies, and immediately informing the national
competent authority and the concerned local community or communities of all findings from the research and
development pertaining to the resource. Id., Art. 8 (1)(ii), (iii).
112 ASEAN, Framework Agreement on Access to Biological and Genetic Resources (draft text Feb. 24, 2000),
available at <http://www.grain.org> [hereinafter ASEAN Agreement]. The Framework Agreement aims at “ensur[ing]
must obtain written prior informed consent from indigenous communities for bioprospecting
within their ancestral lands100 or from other appropriate local authorities.101 The applicant must
also obtain written prior informed consent from any affected private landowner.102 In addition,
it must notify the public of the proposed project through, for example, media advertisements.103
It must also engage in and document “sector consultation,” which involves a “community assembly”
to discuss the project.104 The applicant must agree to pay royalties or other forms of compensa-
tion to the national government and to the indigenous or local community or individual con-
cerned,105 as well as enter into a host of other benefit-sharing arrangements.106 Not surprisingly,
as of October 2001, only two out of thirty-seven proposed projects had garnered all the neces-
sary approvals.107
Model legislation approved by the fifty-three-member Organization of African Unity (OAU)
similarly risks creating an anticommons. The model legislation is to serve as a basis for national
legislation and an Africa-wide convention for restricting access to genetic material.108 The leg-
islation requires a bioprospector to obtain the prior informed consent from both the national
government109 and concerned local communities.110 In addition, collectors may not transfer
obtained biological resources or their derivatives to any third party without prior authorization
from the national competent authority and the concerned local community or communities.111
The potential for an anticommons can further be seen in the yet-to-be-adopted Framework
Agreement on Access to Biological and Genetic Resources112 of the Association of South East
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that access regulations within the ASEAN region are uniform and consistent in accordance with identified min-
imum requirements as set out in this Framework Agreement.” Id., Art. 2.
113 ASEAN is composed of Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore,
Thailand, and Vietnam.
114 ASEAN Agreement, supra note 112, Art. 10. The agreement directs member states to establish legally bind-
ing procedures to require such consent.
115 Id.
116 Id., Art. 11. The agreement stipulates a minimum set of benefit-sharing requirements. These include “[t]he
participation of nationals in research activities; [t]he sharing of research results, including all discoveries; . . .
[f]ees, royalties and financial benefits.” Required benefit sharing also includes the deposit of a complete set of all
voucher specimens in national institutions, “access by nationals to all national specimens deposited in interna-
tional ex-situ collections,” and the “donation to national institutions of equipment used as part of research.” Id.
117 Brazil, Provisional Measure No. 2.186-16 (Aug. 23, 2001), available at <http://www.grain.org/brl/brazil-tk-
2001-en.cfm> [hereinafter Brazil Measure].
118 Id., Arts. 2, 16. The Measure broadly defines genetic heritage as “information of genetic origin contained
in samples . . . of plant, fungal, microbial or animal specimens,” whether living or dead, encountered in situ in Brazil
or maintained in ex situ collections after in situ collection within Brazil. Id., Art. 7(I). “Within Brazil” includes col-
lections done within Brazil’s national territory, on its continental shelf, or in its oceanic exclusive economic zone.
Id. A nation’s exclusive economic zone extends 200 miles off its coast.
119 Id., Art. 3. The Measure requires national government authorization where access is sought for scientific
research, technological development, or exploratory activity to identify components of the genetic heritage with
potential commercial uses. Id., Art. 7(IV), (VII). The Measure creates a national Council for the Management
of Genetic Resources to authorize access to genetic material within Brazil and associated traditional knowledge.
Id., Arts. 10, 11(IV), 15(III). The national council is within the Ministry of Environment.
120 Id., Arts. 16, §9, 11(IV)(b).
121 Id., Art. 16, §9. Where access occurs in a protected area, such as a park, authorization requires the prior
consent of the relevant competent body. Id.
122 Id., Art. 11(IV)(a).
123 Id., Art. 16, §4. Where the “potential for economic use . . . in either a product or process” based on accessed
genetic heritage or derived from traditional knowledge is identified after the collection was authorized and for
which a contract was never signed, “the benefiting institution” must contact the management council to execute
such a contract. Id. §5. 
124 Id., Art. 29.
125 Id., Art. 24. Benefits may include division of profits, royalties, technology transfer, unrestricted licensing
of products or services, and training of persons. Id., Art. 25.
Asian Nations (ASEAN).113 The agreement provides that access to genetic resources in an ASEAN
nation requires the prior informed consent of that nation,114 implicitly at both the national
government and local levels.115 It further states that “all resource providers, particularly indig-
enous peoples and local communities . . . , shall be actively included in the negotiation of
benefits . . . arising from the use of the resource.”116
In August of 2001, Brazil adopted a provisional measure (Measure) to restrict access to genetic
material within its territory. The Measure also appears at risk, albeit to a lesser extent than other
access regimes, of creating an anticommons.117 The Measure requires national government autho-
rization for “access to components of the genetic heritage”118 of any nonhuman organism within
Brazil.119 Such authorization, however, may be granted only with the prior consent of the indig-
enous community involved, where access occurs on indigenous territory.120 Where access occurs
on private land, authorization requires the private landowner’s prior consent.121 In addition, the
consent of the owners of the tangible property involved, such as the plant containing the sought
genetic resources, must be secured.122 Where there is a prospect of commercial use, access to the
components of the genetic heritage requires a benefit-sharing contract.123 The national govern-
ment may, but need not, be a party to the contract. However, all contracts must be submitted
to the national government for registration and approval.124 Where the national government
is not a party to the contract, “it shall be assured where applicable of a share in the benefits.”125
The above analysis of existing and proposed access-restricting regimes illustrates their poten-
tial, as a matter of legislative design, to create an anticommons in raw genetic material. The
collapse in 2001 of a bioprospecting project in Chiapas, Mexico, provides a case study of the
emerging anticommons problem in the bioprospecting area. In September 1998, the Interna-
tional Cooperative Biodiversity Group (ICBG), a U.S. government initiative that includes the
National Institutes of Health (NIH), granted $2.5 million dollars for a project aimed at drug
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126 Christopher Locke, Forest Pharmers Go Bioprospecting, RED HERRING, Apr. 1, 2001, at 84, 86, available at
<http://www.redherring.com>; Joshua Rosenthal, Politics, Culture and Governance in the Development of Prior
Informed Consent and Negotiated Agreements with Indigenous Communities 12 (Sept. 4, 2003) (final draft of
paper prepared by deputy director, Fogarty International Center, Nat’l Insts. of Health). 
127 Locke, supra note 126, at 86.
128 Rosenthal, supra note 126, at 12–13.
129 Id. at 14.
130 Id. at 15.
131 Id.
132 Id. The ICBG would perform the play in a given community only if invited by a municipal president or
community representative.
133 Id. 
134 Id.
135 Id. at 18–19.
136 Id. at 15.
137 Id. at 16; Locke, supra note 126, at 86.
138 Locke, supra note 126, at 86.
139 Rosenthal, supra note 126, at 16. No other researchers, however, had expressed interest in such a project.
Id. The opportunity cost was a phantom or, at best, uncertain. Moreover, it is hard to see how the Mayan ICBG
experience would entice others to venture into its failed wake.
140 Locke, supra note 126, at 86.
141 Id.; Rosenthal, supra note 126, at 17–18.
discovery from plants and microfungi widely used by the highland Maya in Mexico.126 The Uni-
versity of Georgia, the Colegio de la Frontera Sur of Mexico, and a Welsh pharmaceutical com-
pany led the project.127 Mexican law requires a special government permit for “biotechnological”
collections in Mexico and provides for the issuance of permits only if the requester has obtained
prior informed consent from, and negotiated an access and benefit-sharing agreement with,
the owner or legal possessor of the land where sample collecting takes place.128 The implicated
communities in this case involved approximately eight thousand villages and some nine hundred
thousand Mayan-speaking people.129
The ICBG team first held a national forum on Mexican bioprospecting experiences.130 It
then invited Mayan community members to a general information assembly, distributed flyers
in native languages, and ran radio spots to inform the communities of the project and to obtain
their feedback.131 The ICBG team also presented a play about the project in communities and
answered questions.132 The play, performed in native languages, showed the project’s aims and
methods, its short- and long-term benefit-sharing elements, and the low probability of the discov-
ery of a commercially successful drug.133 Community members who wished to participate in the
project were to sign a general memorandum of understanding indicating their interest.134 The
benefit-sharing terms included provision for the creation of a new nonprofit organization to
represent the highland Maya, a trust fund to distribute any financial benefits that emerged from
the project, and a proviso that the new nonprofit organization would receive a joint ownership
interest in any patents that emerged from the project.135 In a year and a half, forty-six of the
forty-seven visited communities in fifteen municipalities agreed to participate in the project.136
The project, however, met vigorous opposition from a confederation of local healers’ organi-
zations, Consejo de Médicos y Parteras Indígenas Tradicionales de Chiapas (COMPITCH),
which claimed that they had not been given the opportunity to voice their opinions about the
project.137 One of their main concerns was “that pharmaceutical companies would collect some-
thing that has always been readily available and free, synthesize it, slap a patent on it, and sell
it as a new ‘drug’ accessible only to the rich.”138 Another concern was the opportunity cost—
namely, that other researchers who might offer greater benefits would not seek to duplicate the
ICBG effort.139 The Rural Advancement Foundation International (RAFI), an international
nongovernmental organization, further objected to the project because private companies,
including GlaxoSmithKlein, would have benefited from the research. A RAFI researcher stated
that “[w]e think it is completely wrong to use public money to fund research for private compa-
nies.”140 In the face of objections from these groups, the requisite bioprospecting permit did
not issue, and the project collapsed in 2001.141
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142 Rosenthal, supra note 126, at 17–18.
143 See infra note 146.
144 Rosenthal, supra note 126, at 21–22.
145 Id.
146 David Labrador, Refining Green Gold, SCI. AM., Dec. 2003, at 38; Macilwain, supra note 24 (reporting how
the anticipated post-CBD “gold rush” of scientists hurrying to developing countries to bioprospect has failed to
materialize); see TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note 65, at 300–01. As of 1999, not a single access agreement had been
negotiated with any Andean Pact nation. Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32, at 35–43. Since then, a small
handful have been concluded. Telephone interview with Joshua Rosenthal, deputy director, Fogarty Institute,
NIH ( July 7, 2003). 
147 Locke, supra note 126, at 84. 
148 Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32.
149 Id. A three-hundred-page book by Kerry ten Kate and Sarah Laird, supra note 65, on the commercial use
of biological diversity discusses surprisingly few nongovernment bioprospecting projects involving access to
specimens of genetic material for potential application in a commercial good, since the adoption of the CBD.
A large percentage, if not the majority, of the “benefit-sharing” cases discussed occurred earlier and involved U.S.
government subsidies or traditional payment for the extraction of bulk raw materials that are used as inputs for end
products rather than genetic sampling. An example of bulk raw material is the bulk cultivation of Kava for export.
150 Bioprospecting projects are taking place, see BROWN, supra note 6, at 139–40; TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note
65, but at relatively low levels, see notes 146 and 147 supra, and note 153 infra and corresponding text.
151 See Rai, supra note 7, at 192–93.
152 See note 146 supra; see generally TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note 65, at 32 (noting that access regimes are elab-
orate and that many domestic and foreign scientists and companies report finding them cumbersome, time-con-
suming, and costly to follow). 
The above incident does not reflect an anticommons tragedy in the strictest legal sense. The
two most powerful voices objecting to the project, COMPITCH and RAFI, did not technically
enjoy veto power over the project under Mexican law. As a de facto matter, however, at least
in the case of COMPITCH, they did. Their objections ultimately carried greater weight than the
consent of the Mayan communities participating in the project and the involvement of a local
university.142 This incident reflects the anticommons environment in which bioprospectors now
operate in much of the developing world.143 The objections of any one group, whether legally,
culturally, or politically empowered, can prevent the other groups from going forward with a
project potentially beneficial to themselves and to human health.
The ICBG spent thousands of dollars and nearly two years trying to obtain the prior informed
consent of the groups in whose land it wished to bioprospect. As a U.S.-taxpayer-funded enter-
prise with a commitment to exploring and developing models of ethical research, the ICBG
could develop expensive, multiyear efforts to garner multiple prior informed consents and nego-
tiate agreements.144 This, however, is a privileged situation. It is not the reality for the vast majority
of projects sponsored by government, academic, or industrial organizations.145 
While numerous access-restricting regimes are now in place and scores more in the offing,
rather than engendering impressive economic gains, the CBD and the laws that it inspired are
driving companies away from bioprospecting activities.146 They are leading to the underutil-
ization of genetic resources due to their complexity and the difficulty of achieving the consent
of all interested parties. For every bioprospecting success story, there are dozens of cases where
the projects never got off the ground.147 A study conducted by Columbia University unearthed
few successful examples of bioprospecting.148 Many of those that did occur involved the ICBG ini-
tiative, a project funded by U.S. taxpayers, rather than private enterprise or individual scientists.149
While bioprospecting has not ground to a halt in the wake of the CBD, access and benefit-
sharing arrangements are taking place at a relatively slow rate, well below the level anticipated
at the time of the CBD’s adoption and at international negotiations on access and benefit shar-
ing since then.150 Patent scholars note that where an anticommons arises in a particular area,
researchers may simply avoid the area rather than navigate the anticommons.151 A similar
problem appears to be occurring in the area of bioprospecting. Rather than navigate the access
regimes and attempt to garner the consent or approval of multiple rights-holders, researchers
are simply refraining from bioprospecting in the first place.152 For example, after spending one
million dollars and two years attempting to navigate Colombia’s access regime, BioAndes, a private
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153 Columbia Access Paper, supra note 32, at 35–43. In addition, a Colombian national abandoned a biopros-
pecting project altogether after realizing the ramifications of the application process. Id. at 43.
154 Benefit-Sharing Case Studies: Aristocladus korupensis and Prunus africana, Doc. UNEP/CBD/COP/4/Inf.25,
at 6, 7, 10–14 (1998), available at <http://www.biodiv.org/doc/case-studies/abs/cs-abs-aristo-pdf>.
155 Heller, supra note 84, at 622, 677, 688.
156 See notes 71–83 supra and corresponding text.
157 Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, No. 169, June 27, 1989,
Art. 15(2), 28 ILM 1382 (1989), reprinted in ILO, INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
1919–1991, at 1436 (1992).
158 Indeed, human rights scholarship is replete with examples of sovereign abuse of individuals and indigenous
communities to further national government political and economic objectives. See, e.g., Judy Mayotte, Civil War
in Sudan: The Paradox of Human Rights and National Sovereignty, 47 J. INT’L AFF. 497 (1994).
159 Brazil Measure, supra note 117, Art. 17.
joint venture between a U.S. pharmaceutical company and a Colombian concern, abandoned
its efforts not only in Colombia, but also in the entire Andean Pact region.153 
In the alternative, researchers and companies may brave the anticommons quagmire only
in rare cases involving genetic material with a high probability of value. For example, biopros-
pecting continued in Cameroon after it promulgated a national access regime. In that case, scien-
tists already knew that a valuable plant existed in the Cameroonian rain forest and they con-
tinued relationships built before the CBD.154 However, the Cameroonian access regime that is
now in place increases the difficulty of making similar discoveries in the future.
Fixing an anticommons once it emerges presents no easy task. Heller warns that undoing an
anticommons can be “brutal and slow” and even thwarted entirely by transaction costs, holdouts,
and those seeking rents disproportionate to their contribution.155 The easiest solution to an
anticommons problem is to vest ownership or ownership’s core right, the right to exclude, in
a single entity. The more recent access regime of India reflects this trend, centralizing control
in a national entity.156 While Brazil’s access-restricting Measure requires the consent of multiple
stakeholders, it also centralizes control over bioprospecting in the national government. The
problem with this temptingly easy fix is the risks that such centralization poses to the interests
of individuals and indigenous communities whose property contains the genetic material that
the sovereign has claimed or granted access to in exchange for remuneration.
Risks to Individuals and Indigenous Communities
Robust sovereign rights over raw genetic material threaten the autonomy and interests of
individuals and indigenous communities in two ways. First, in the case of access regimes where
the national government owns genetic material (e.g., Colombia), the refusal by an individual or
an indigenous community to consent to a particular bioprospecting project obstructs the gov-
ernment’s ability to profit from and use its own property. In such a situation, the State may
pressure the individual or indigenous community to grant consent. In the alternative, the State
may simply access its genetic property by force. International law provides insufficient protection
to individuals and indigenous communities in those circumstances. The International Labour
Organization’s Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Coun-
tries provides that where the State retains ownership of resources related to indigenous lands,
it must merely “consult” with indigenous peoples before permitting the exploration or exploi-
tation of such resources.157 It does not require the State to abide by the wishes of the indigenous
communities concerned.
I have been unable to find any reported incidents in which governments physically forced
individuals or indigenous communities to part with genetic material contained on their lands
or in their property. However, the potential for such actions exists.158 Brazil’s access-restricting
regime, for example, expressly allows the national government to authorize entry onto private
land for the taking of samples of “genetic heritage,” without the consent of the owners of the
material or land, “[i]n the event of relevant public interest” as determined by the national gov-
ernment.159 As a general matter, researchers report tensions between those who view their countries’
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art15
2004] HYPEROWNERSHIP IN A TIME OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL PROMISE 659
160 BROWN, supra note 6, at 160. See generally Traci L. McClellan, Note and Comment, The Role of International Law
in Protecting the Traditional Knowledge and Plant Life of Indigenous Peoples, 19 WIS. INT’L L.J. 249 (2001) (discussing
struggle of indigenous people to obtain the right to control resources). 
161 David Cyranoski, Microbe Hunt Raises Doubts over Local Benefits of Bioprospecting, 420 NATURE 109 ( 2002).
162 Id.
163 Id.
164 Indigenous communities have been relocated and their lands expropriated, and governments have used
force to suppress their objections to oil exploration. See Judith Kimerling, ‘The Human Face of Petroleum’: Sustain-
able Development in Amazonia, 10 RECIEL 65, 73 (2001); Amazon Watch, Burlington’s Oil Projects vs. Indigenous
Communities and Rainforest Protection (2003), at <http://www.amazonwatch.org/amazon/EC/burling/>; Pipob
Udomittipong & Tyler R. Giannini, Expanding Oil in Collapsing Markets? South East Asia, at <http://www.ran.
org/oilreport/seasia.html> (visited Sept. 24, 2004); Pipob Udomittipong & Tyler R. Giannini, Offshore Boom,
Onshore Impact: Central Africa, at <http://www.ran.org/oilreport/africa.html> (visited Sept. 24, 2004).
165 In the case of oil, the government of Nigeria suppressed those who opposed oil drilling on indigenous lands
even to the point of executing noted activist Kenneth Saro Wiwa. See, e.g., Logan Michael Breed, Note, Regulating
Our 21st-Century Ambassadors: A New Approach to Corporate Liability for Human Rights Violations Abroad, 42 VA. J.
INT’L L. 1005, 1010 (2002).
166 In both India’s and Brazil’s access legislation, the government grants consent for the bioprospecting proj-
ect, and it is the job of the government to obtain any necessary consent from local communities or engage in the
watered-down obligation of “consultation” with them. 
167 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 53, at 955 (“The goal is not simply to receive money in exchange for access to knowl-
edge and resources, but to control whether, and how, such knowledge is commercialized, while also leaving it avail-
able for noncommercial uses.”). See generally Rosemary J. Coombe, Intellectual Property, Human Rights & Sovereignty:
New Dilemmas in International Law Posed by the Recognition of Indigenous Knowledge and the Conservation of Biodiversity,
6 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 59, 100–03 (1999) (emphasizing the need for indigenous communities to be able to
say no to the use of their resources); Lakshmi Sarma, Note, Biopiracy: Twentieth Century Imperialism in the Form of Inter-
national Agreements, 13 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 107 (1999) (stressing the importance to indigenous people of
controlling their resources).
flora and fauna as national patrimony and indigenous communities who consider such resources
their own.160
One situation that may result in coercive action by a government involves the recent approval
by the Chinese government of a bioprospecting project to locate microbes in Tibet.161 The pro-
ceeds of the project will go to the Chinese government. Local Tibetan communities were not
consulted, and they are not expected to reap benefits from the project.162 It is hard to imagine
that the Chinese government will allow local opposition to prevent the undertaking. Indeed,
indigenous rights groups are calling on the outside researchers to protect the interests of indig-
enous communities, asserting that the Chinese government will not do so.163 In the case of oil,
a much less pervasive resource than the genetic material of all nonhuman living things, history
abounds with examples of coercive actions by sovereigns that have claimed oil located on indig-
enous lands.164 Since genetic material can be extracted without relocating entire populations,
the most extreme kinds of coercion that have occurred with regard to oil are unlikely to occur
with regard to raw genetic material. What is more likely is that governments will suppress those
who object to a given project and disregard the concerns of indigenous groups and individuals
affected by a bioprospecting project that promises to generate revenue.165
As for the second kind of threat posed by robust sovereign rights in this context, even if the
State does not assert an exclusive ownership interest over genetic material but, rather, as in
Brazil and India, centralizes control over genetic material in the national government to ensure
benefit sharing for the nation, this paternalism necessarily diminishes the ability of individuals
and indigenous communities to control the genetic resources in question for themselves.166 This
problem becomes particularly acute where there is a conflict between the government’s inter-
ests and those of the individuals and indigenous communities. Such conflict seems likely given
that the government’s primary motivation is to obtain benefit sharing for itself and the country.
The individuals or indigenous communities concerned may or may not share this goal and might
have other goals that they consider more important. In fact, indigenous communities tend to
stress control over resources and related knowledge above compensation.167 Ironically, in the
paternalistic regimes, indigenous communities have effectively lost direct control over genetic
material, the thing they most care about, as a result of the State’s drive to garner compensation
for the nation.
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like this may be too optimistic, government agencies and the private sector have used indigenous knowledge of
the applications of plants and other organisms to lead them to raw material helpful for drug development. See
BROWN, supra note 6, at 104, 125–32, 140–41; TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note 65, at 61; 7 PHARMACEUTICAL
BIOLOGY 5 ( Joshua Rosenthal ed., 1999).
170 Biological Diversity Act, supra note 71, §§3(1), 4; Brazil Measure, supra note 117, Arts. 8, 11(IV)(b), 12, 16.
171 Canada, for example, recently vested indigenous communities with a range of natural resources. 
172 Roht-Arriaza, supra note 53, at 948.
173 See BROWN, supra note 6, at 99 (reporting that Peru threatened to take away land given to indigenous com-
munities if those communities did not commercially develop the lands but, rather, continued to use them for sub-
sistence agriculture).
174 Cindy Hamilton, The Human Genome Diversity Project and the New Biological Imperialism, 41 SANTA CLARA L.
REV. 619, 621–22 (2001); see, e.g., TEN KATE & LAIRD, supra note 65, at 45 (global net sales of human proteins devel-
oped by rDNA techniques reached $7.7 billion in 1993 alone); Fisher, supra note 2.
175 Hamilton, supra note 174, at 621– 22.
176 George J. Annas, Rules for Research on Human Genetic Variation—Lessons from Iceland, 342 NEW ENG. J. MED.
1830 (2000); Gene Prospecting in Remote Populations, SCIENCE, Oct. 24, 1997, at 565; Hamilton, supra note 174, at 623;
The extent of government intrusion into the liberty of individuals and indigenous commu-
nities is illustrated by the extension of government control, in the paternalistic model adopted
by Brazil and India, not only over genetic material, but also over indigenous knowledge about
the uses of such material.168 This is not surprising since the object of these regimes is to obtain
remuneration for the country, and traditional knowledge of the raw material’s uses often gives
value to the raw material itself.169 Under these countries’ regimes, foreigners may not obtain
either genetic material or knowledge about the healing or other uses of such things as plants or
animals from shamans, individuals, or indigenous communities, without the Indian or Brazil-
ian government’s consent.170 These restrictions effectively curtail the liberty of those individuals
and communities who may wish to share their knowledge. 
States, with several notable exceptions,171 have not generally protected the rights or interests
of indigenous or traditional communities but, instead, have often facilitated their destruction.
Moreover, there is little reason to believe that the State will use funds negotiated on behalf of
individuals or indigenous communities for their benefit.172 Given the choice between respecting
the wishes of indigenous communities and individuals and potentially enhancing their coun-
tries’ technological development and resource-starved coffers, national governments may and,
if history is a guide, generally will choose the latter over the former.173 Vesting the sovereign with
rights over genetic material in order to protect individuals and indigenous communities from
bioprospectors may be likened to having the proverbial fox guard the henhouse. 
To avoid the specter of sovereigns compelling individuals or indigenous communities to part
with genetic material, one might create a system (as exemplified by that of the Philippines, the
OAU model legislation, and others) in which all interested parties must agree to a given bio-
prospecting project before it may proceed. This solution does not address the second issue of
the curtailment of the liberty of individuals and communities to alienate genetic material against
the government’s wishes, but it does reduce the risk that the government will force individuals
or communities to part with genetic material. However, as discussed above, this multiconsent
approach creates an anticommons problem. 
The tension between fixing or avoiding an anticommons and protecting the interests of
stakeholders will likely become more pronounced as nations and the international community
eventually grapple with controlling access to what portends to be the most lucrative genetic mate-
rial: human genetic material. The human genome holds greater potential for drug development
than the genes of plants and animals.174 The “genetic gold” is less likely to lie in the genetic makeup
of a frog in the Amazon than in the genetic makeup of isolated indigenous communities.175 
Researchers seeking genetic links to diseases and drugs to cure them prize access to DNA from
unusually homogeneous and isolated populations.176 DNA samples from a relatively uniform
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gene pool facilitate identification of genetic deviations that may cause medical disorders.177
Genetic researchers have thus targeted the relatively homogeneous populations of Estonia,
Finland, Iceland, Tonga, and certain groups in China,178 as well as isolated and relatively ho-
mogeneous populations in mountain villages in Italy179 and on the small island of Tristan da
Cunha.180 In the United States, researchers have shown particular interest in Native American
populations.181 
At present, the laws and draft laws that restrict access to genetic material to obtain remuner-
ation for the nation exclude human genetic material from their ambit.182 This being said, uneas-
iness over the use of human genetic resources for scientific or commercial purposes has been
growing.183 These concerns often mirror those raised in the context of bioprospecting in the
nonhuman context. Many object to the unfairness of permitting companies to profit from pat-
ented genes or goods utilizing such genes without compensating the donors of the underlying
genetic material.184 When human genetic material comes from developing countries, concerns
about the fair and equitable sharing of benefits between developed and developing countries
arise as well.185 In addition, many object to the patenting of human genetic material.186
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his (her) legal representatives.” Id., Art. 12. The rules’ consent requirements, however, do not appear to apply to
genetic material secured by the Chinese government. For a discussion of international rules for the protection of
individuals, see note 204 infra.
195 Transfert.net, La Chine passera à la carte d’identité électronique à partir de janvier 2004 (Sept. 1, 2003), at
<http://www.transfert.net>. The card, which is required for all citizens over sixteen, also includes the person’s
nationality, address, and place of birth.
196 Id.
197 The proviso in the Universal Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights, supra note 184, that
“the human genome in its natural state shall not give rise to financial benefits” does not appear to restrict such
alienation. Presumably a gene, once removed, is no longer in its natural state. Also, the declaration refers to the
entire human genome rather than individual genes. For potential limitations on government actions, see infra
note 204. 
Despite a decision of the Parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity to exclude human
genetic material from the Convention’s treatment of natural resources,187 a trend toward view-
ing human genetic material as a natural or national resource is apparent. For example, reports
on human genetic research in China trumpet the importance of ethnic diversity as a national
resource, describing the distinct characteristics of China’s numerous ethnic groups as a “gold-
mine” for population geneticists.188 In fact, entire populations are seen as “treasure” or “valuable
resources” that open up an opportunity for “mining a rich seam of genetic diversity.”189 An article
reporting on a proposed deal between Tonga and an Australian biotechnology firm, which
would have given the firm access to the DNA of Tongans, explains how that isolated Pacific archi-
pelago would “add DNA to its more usual trade in fish, coconuts and coffee.”190 In the words of
another article, “selling its DNA secrets” is one of the ways that “Tonga’s constitutional mon-
archy is obtaining hard currency in the modern global economy.”191
Concerns about the export of human genes prompted China to promulgate national rules
governing access to human genetic material.192 The rules require that “[a]ny institution or indi-
vidual who discovers or holds important pedigrees and [human] genetic resources” in certain
regions must immediately report them to the relevant national departments.193 The rules also
state that “[n]o institution or individual may sample, collect, trade, export human genetic
resources or take them outside the territory of the People’s Republic of China, or provide them
to other countries” without government permission.194 Separate legislation requires national
identity cards to include an eighteen-digit code referencing each person’s genetic code.195 This
code is derived from a required sample of the person’s blood, tissue, or hair.196 Thus, China will
now have a DNA sample or at least a record of a DNA sample of every citizen’s genetic makeup.
Such samples or records may be cross-referenced on the basis of nationality, family, and local-
ity, and potentially alienated by the government.197
While present legal regimes distinguish between human and nonhuman genetic resources,
this distinction may not hold over time. The rules and approaches currently being laid down,
both nationally and internationally, regarding national government ownership and control of
nonhuman genetic resources so as to obtain financial and other benefits for the nation can
probably be expected to apply to or materially affect future legal regimes governing access to
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200 WHO REPORT, supra note 183.
201 See, e.g., U.S. Patent No. 4,370,417,1026 (issued Jan. 25, 1983) (patent for DNA sequence for plasminogen
activator protein); U.S. Patent No. 4,703,008,1083 (issued Oct. 27, 1987) (patent for DNA sequence for erythro-
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204 The nonbinding UNESCO Declaration on the Human Genome and Human Rights of 1998, supra note 184,
and the nonbinding International Declaration on Human Genetic Data, Oct. 16, 2003, available at <http://www.
unesco.org>, provide some protections for individuals. Article 5 of the 1998 declaration requires researchers
to obtain the free and informed consent of participants in genetic research. The 2003 declaration stipulates that
genetic material should be extracted from humans only with their prior informed consent and that such material
should not be used for an incompatible different purpose without their consent. The State, however, may decide
to do away with this requirement for “compelling reasons by domestic law consistent with the international law
of human rights.” 2003 declaration, supra, Art. 8(a). In addition, material given for one reason may be used for
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human genetic material as well.198 Indeed, some are already suggesting that the CBD govern
or the parties otherwise address access to human genetic material.199 Others, while not going
that far, point to the CBD as a model. A 2002 report by an advisory committee to the World
Health Organization on genomics and world health, for example, expressly includes a detailed
discussion of the CBD’s approach to benefit sharing as a potential guide for such sharing in the
human genetics area.200 Admittedly, humans differ from trees. Yet developed countries quickly
moved from patenting the microbe to patenting human genes. The U.S. Supreme Court handed
down its seminal Chakrabarty decision, which allowed the patenting of genetically engineered
microbes, in 1980. Within a few years, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office was granting pat-
ents on human genes,201 and in 1991 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit upheld
such patenting.202 Thus, in less than a decade, the United States moved from patenting the
microbe to patenting the human gene. Moreover, in the celebrated case of Moore v. Regents of the
University of California, the California Supreme Court upheld the University of California’s own-
ership of Moore’s cell line.203 If the University of California, a state institution, can own an indi-
vidual’s cell line, cannot the national government of China or another country own the cell lines
of their populations? National governments, having gained comfort from their ownership or
extensive control of nonhuman genetic resources to obtain benefits for the nation, can make
the jump to human genetic material, as the patent system has done, with the attendant risks
to human liberty and autonomy.204 
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212 Some commentators argue that the Convention distinguishes genetic resources from other natural resources
because it stipulates that national governments should facilitate access to genetic resources. See, e.g., David Downes,
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logical Diversity, 4 TOURO J. TRANSNAT’L L. 1, 8–9 (1993). This position is largely undercut by the language of
Article 15(1) of the Convention, which plainly likens genetic material to other natural resources. Moreover, the
Convention’s requirement that countries facilitate access to genetic material is weak, requiring them solely to
“endeavour” to create conditions to facilitate access. CBD, supra note 39, Art. 15(2). This weak obligation is
further eroded by other provisions, which encourage countries to obtain “benefit sharing” for the use of genetic
resources (Art. 1) and specify that access to genetic material normally requires the prior informed consent of the
national government (Art. 15(5)). Such controls are not normally prescribed by treaty for other natural resources.
Not surprisingly, nations in the aftermath of the CBD have not promulgated laws to enable and facilitate access
to genetic material but, rather, to curtail access to such material to obtain monetary and other benefits. 
213 CBD, supra note 39, Arts. 15(5) (“Access to genetic resources shall be subject to prior informed consent of
the Contracting Party providing such resources, unless otherwise determined by that Party.”), 15(3) (“For the
purpose of this Convention, the genetic resources being provided by a Contracting Party, as referred to in this
III. INTERNATIONAL LAW’S MISHANDLING OF GENETIC MATERIAL AND ITS IMPLICATIONS
The Convention on Biological Diversity essentially takes the position that genetic material
is the same as any tangible natural resource, such as oil and timber, over which sovereigns exer-
cise control and even ownership.205 But is it? While genes have a tangible component (i.e., a
minuscule combination of chemicals), they share more in common with an intangible good like
information than they do with a typical tangible natural resource like oil.206 What holds value
and is really being sought is not so much a particular physical cell as the information, the blue-
print, contained in that cell and, in fact, in millions of similar cells.207 Moreover, as with infor-
mation, the use of genetic material is largely nonrivalrous in that its use by one person generally
does not diminish its availability for use by others.208 One need not fell a forest to access its
genetic material, and removed genes can be replicated. This feature puts it into sharp contrast
with oil, minerals, and timber, whose use is rivalrous.209 The exploiter of the latter goods is after
the raw physical substance, not the information it contains.210 Their taking by one person ren-
ders them unavailable for the use of others.211 
This perspective on the similarity of genes to an intangible good did not make its way into
international law. The Convention on Biological Diversity and national and international mea-
sures promulgated pursuant to the Convention largely assume that sovereigns should exercise
similar rights over the subcellular genetic sequences of all nonhuman living things within their
jurisdiction to those they exercise over oil or timber. In some ways, the Convention encourages
sovereigns to exercise more control over genetic material, stipulating government consent for
access to such material so that nations can benefit from its use.212 This approach has led nations
on a quixotic quest to control the extraction of genetic material from within their borders in
an effort to prevent any potentially valuable information it may contain from escaping. A rough
analogy would be if sovereigns decided to take control of the removal of written words from
their countries, under the theory of sovereign rights over the paper within their borders, so that
information conveyed by those words could not leave their territory.
This flawed approach is likely to exacerbate already high tensions between nations over own-
ership of genetic material. First, since what is really being sought is the information represented
by genetic sequences, the ownership of this information becomes a fundamental question. This
problem is particularly acute when, as often happens, the genetic sequence may appear in more
than one nation. The CBD stipulates that the “country of origin” providing the genetic material
is the one that must consent to its access and ostensibly receive benefits arising from its use.213
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inated in that country.” 
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that have been transported by human beings from one country to another “naturally occur” in the new country?
217 Stone, supra note 52, at 984. 
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219 Id.; Jacoby & Weiss, supra note 36, at 93 (predicting that policing and patrolling borders to control the flow
of genetic resources would be difficult and expensive).
220 See Stone, supra note 44, at 605.
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patent application); Glowka, supra note 4, at 332 (calling for shifting enforcement burdens from source countries
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222 Biological Diversity Act, supra note 71, §6(1).
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The country of origin, in turn, is defined as the country which possesses those genetic resources
within “ecosystems and natural habitats, . . . and, in the case of domesticated or cultivated spe-
cies,” such as most agricultural goods, “in the surroundings where they have developed their
distinctive properties.”214 Ascertaining where a given gene acquired its distinctive properties
can be both difficult and controversial.215 Whether a gene “naturally occurs” in a given country
may also provoke controversy.216 Fights between countries are likely to arise as they quarrel over
which gene “originated” where and which nation should rightfully capture any benefits arising
from its use. 
Second, simply to state the goal of controlling the extraction of all potentially valuable sub-
cellular genetic sequences is to highlight obvious enforcement problems. The extraction of oil,
minerals, and timber tends to be fairly visible, often requiring expensive structures and con-
tinuous activity.217 Violation of laws restricting such extraction can readily be seen. Enforcement
challenges are manageable.218 The same cannot be said about the extraction of genetic material.
Genes are contained in a twig, a leaf, a spoonful of soil, a butterfly wing. They can be removed
easily, making the cost of policing high.219
To the extent that genes have a tangible component, that component is renewable, largely
abundant rather than scarce, and amenable to discrete extraction. The challenge presented to
developing countries by the CBD is how to take a nonrivalrous, abundant resource and make
it exclusive. How can nations prevent most, let alone all, genetic sequences of potential value
from leaving their borders? They cannot.220 
Developing countries, therefore, are increasingly turning to patent systems to enforce their
access-restricting regimes.221 The access-restricting regimes of India and Brazil, as well as the
model laws of the ASEAN nations and the OAU, reflect the enforcement link being made by
developing countries to this effect. As mentioned above, India’s law prohibits any person from
applying for any intellectual property right anywhere to inventions based on research or infor-
mation on a biological resource obtained from India without the prior approval of the National
Biodiversity Authority.222 The authority may impose a benefit-sharing fee and/or royalty as a
condition of approval.223 The Brazilian Measure stipulates that Brazil’s grant of any intellectual
property right “for a process or product obtained using samples of components of the genetic
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in violation of the Measure is subject to a penalty of 20% of the gross amount obtained from selling or licensing
the product or process. Id., Art. 26.
226 Jeffrey, supra note 16; Pires de Carvalho, supra note 221.
227 Seiler & Dutfield, supra note 54, at 90.
228 Id.
229 See, e.g., World Trade Organization, TRIPS: Reviews, Article 27.3(B) and Related Issues, Background and
the Current Situation, at <http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/art27_3b_background_e.htm> (last modified
June 24, 2004).
230 World Trade Organization, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, The Rela-
tionship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity and the Protection of Tradi-
tional Knowledge, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/403, paras. 1, 9 ( June 24, 2003). In addition, China, Pakistan, Zambia, and
Zimbabwe had made a similar proposal to the TRIPS Council in 2001. Id., para. 1 & n.2. The WTO documents cited
here and below are available online at <http://www.wto.org>.
231 WTO Doc. IP/C/W/403, supra note 230, para. 14.
232 Id., para. 21.
233 World Trade Organization, Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Taking
Forward the Review of Article 27.3(b) of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO Doc. IP/C/W/404 §III(D) ( June 26, 2003).
The African Group proposed that Article 29 of the TRIPS Agreement be amended as follows: “Members shall
require an applicant for a patent to disclose the country and area of origin of any biological resources and tra-
ditional knowledge used or involved in the invention, and to provide confirmation of compliance with all access
regulations in the country of origin.” 
heritage is contingent on the observance” of the Measure.224 Applicants for patents and other
forms of intellectual property protection in Brazil must “specify the origin of the genetic material
and the associated traditional knowledge,” presumably in their applications for such protec-
tions.225 Costa Rica’s access regime, as well as that of the Andean Pact, also links the granting
of intellectual property rights to compliance with the source countries’ access laws.226 The OAU
model legislation prohibits a collector from applying for any form of intellectual property pro-
tection over the collected biological resource, its parts, or its derivatives without the prior informed
consent of the original providers.227 While not mentioning intellectual property rights in par-
ticular, the ASEAN Framework Agreement stipulates that, as part of the benefit-sharing arrange-
ment, resource providers shall receive, without payment of a royalty, all technologies developed
from research on the provided materials.228 
In conformity with their own practice of linking the patent application and the patent grant
to compliance with their access-restricting regimes, developing countries are increasingly
demanding that the United States and other developed countries require patent applicants to
disclose the country of origin of any genetic material used to develop the item sought to be pro-
tected.229 In addition, they are demanding that developed countries either refuse to enforce or
refrain from granting patents to innovations, such as synthesized genes and bioengineered
goods, that utilize material that came from developing countries, unless it was obtained in com-
pliance with the country of origin’s access-restricting laws. For example, in connection with the
2003 meeting of the TRIPS Council, Bolivia, Brazil, Cuba, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
India, Peru, Thailand, and Venezuela proposed amending the TRIPS Agreement to require,
as a condition of patent acquisition, (1) the disclosure of the source and country of origin of
genetic resources used in the invention, (2) evidence that the country of origin had consented
to its extraction and use, and (3) “evidence of fair and equitable benefit sharing under the rele-
vant national regime.”230 They further proposed that failure by an applicant to provide this
information should render the patent unenforceable.231 They argued that these amendments
were “imperative to implement the TRIPS Agreement and the CBD in a mutually supportive
and complementary way.”232 The African Group, which consists of all African nations that belong
to the WTO, proposed a similar amendment to the TRIPS Agreement,233 arguing that the Agree-
ment “has not provided adequate and equitable means to prevent patents mainly in developed
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of patents but, in the words of the proposal, “would allow WTO Members to keep track . . . of all patent applica-
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241 See MARTIN J. ADELMAN ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON PATENT LAW, 2D at 60 (2003) (highlighting the
importance of TRIPS for the pharmaceutical industry); Martin J. Adelman & Sonia Badia, Prospects and Limits of the
Patent Provision in the TRIPS Agreement: The Case of India, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 507, 524, 532 (1996) (Prior to
Members that have amounted to and resulted in the misappropriation of genetic resources . . . .
from developing Members.”234 
The United States and other developed countries did not agree to these demands.235 They
will probably continue to refuse to condition the patent grant or its enforcement on the dis-
closure of information indicating the applicant’s compliance with access-restricting regimes.236
Doing so would involve the consideration of criteria unrelated to the requirements of patent-
ability.237 Traditionally, the patent system has steadfastly declined to serve as a vehicle for enforc-
ing any nonpatent regulatory scheme.238 The demands of the developing countries that the pat-
ent system help enforce their access-restricting laws and the likely hostility of developed coun-
tries, particularly the United States, to such demands will exacerbate tensions between these
nations regarding genetic material and bioengineered goods. 
In addition, the linkage that most access-restricting regimes make between compliance with
their terms and the grant (or the enforcement) of patents portends a TRIPS dispute of massive
proportions. A country will run afoul of the TRIPS Agreement if it refuses to issue a patent to an
otherwise patentable invention, such as a drug, because the genetic material used in it was
obtained in violation of the access rules of that country or of another country.239 Article 27.1
of the TRIPS Agreement stipulates that “patents shall be available for any inventions, . . .
provided that they are new, involve an inventive step and are capable of industrial application.”
Whether genetic resources were acquired in compliance with a country’s access-restricting regime
has no bearing on these criteria for patentability.240 
Through the TRIPS Agreement, developed countries sought to prevent the widespread copy-
ing of patented goods, such as pharmaceutical products, that was occurring in developing coun-
tries.241 Thus, if countries like Brazil and India begin to deny or refuse to enforce patents to a
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range of drugs because their development involved or allegedly involved genetic material taken
without their consent, these drugs could once again be freely manufactured and sold in devel-
oping countries. Developed countries would lose some of the important gains that they
achieved through the TRIPS Agreement at considerable cost to their industries.242 Conse-
quently, if such denials or refusals to enforce patents begin to occur, they could be transformed
into a major trade dispute.243 
IV. THE ARGUMENT FOR A MORE OPEN SYSTEM FOR GENETIC MATERIAL
There are three principal reasons why the community of nations should temper the present
twin systems of ownership of genetic material and take steps toward establishing a more open
system for such material. First, the sovereign-based and the patent-based systems of ownership
suffer from multiple problems. Second, these problems and the corrosive interplay between the
two ownership systems are leading to the underutilization of genetic material with the com-
mensurate opportunity cost of potentially beneficial biotechnological goods. Third, a more
open system for genetic material would encourage innovation, promote conservation of such
material, and facilitate collaboration between developed and developing countries. 
The preceding parts identify three major problems related to the sovereign-based ownership
system for genetic material: (1) it is creating an anticommons in raw genetic material; (2) it
threatens the autonomy and liberty of individuals and indigenous communities; and (3) it is based
on a flawed approach in international law that has led to unenforceable regimes destined to
increase tensions between nations and threatens to lead to a major TRIPS dispute. For all of
its problems, the sovereign-based system boasts few benefits. The best argument for extensive
sovereign control over genetic material is to obtain benefits for the nation of origin. Arguably,
such control is necessary to prevent individual actors from providing easy access to the material,
undercutting the ability of the nation and its citizens to generate revenue from it. However, the
access-restricting regimes have not generated, nor appear likely to generate, much revenue, let
alone enough to convince countries to preserve natural habitats as environmentalists had
hoped.244 If anything, the Convention on Biological Diversity and the laws that it inspired have
driven companies away from bioprospecting.245 Moreover, these regimes are costly to administer
and enforce.246 
As stated at the outset, this article focuses on the sovereign-based system, but the patent system
in the genetics area is also flawed. In the United States, it too is, or at a minimum risks, creat-
ing an anticommons in genetic material that deters innovation.247 Dan Burk and Mark Lemley
summarize the current unhappy situation as follows: “Patentees have acquired thousands of
patents on DNA sequences that cover specific genes or in some cases fragments of genes. . . .
Any particular gene therapy requires the simultaneous use of many of these patents, leading
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(Mugabe et al. eds., 1997); see Thompson, supra note 25 (describing race to isolate and discover functions of genes).
258 See notes 146, 152, & 153 supra and corresponding text.
259 See notes 221–28 supra and corresponding text.
to anticommons problems.”248 It is estimated, for example, that scientists in creating the cele-
brated “golden rice,” a strain genetically engineered for enhanced vitamin A, may have infringed
as many as seventy patents.249 The scientists who created the rice, which might prevent thou-
sands of cases of blindness a year, report that they could not have done so had they attempted
to identify and secure the consent of all implicated patent holders.250 
In addition to anticommons problems, genetic patenting may be leading to a related prob-
lem of patent thickets.251 In contrast to an anticommons, which requires the aggregation of
multiple inputs to create a single product, patent thickets occur when multiple overlapping
patents cover the same technology and can choke an industry.252 In a patent thicket environ-
ment, holders of patents can prevent each other from fully utilizing the corresponding rights,
as each holder’s right overlaps with, and hence infringes upon, a right held by another.253
Not all agree that the present U.S. system for patenting genetic material is flawed.254 Most
scholars, however, seem to believe that the patent system in the genetics area has overreached
and is inhibiting innovation. As Dreyfuss notes, “[T]he literature questioning aspects of geno-
mic patenting and proposing all sorts of interventions” to limit the innovation-inhibiting aspects
of such patenting, such as compulsory licensing, experimental use defenses, and condemnation
proceedings, is growing “large” and “fast.”255 
Patents on little-improved genetic material may not even be needed to encourage researchers
and companies to discover the functions of genes.256 Companies have a built-in incentive to dis-
cover the functions of genes so they can develop potentially lucrative downstream products such
as drugs and therapeutics dependent upon the upstream gene discovery. Granting patents to
isolated and identified genes presumably fosters the disclosure of their identity and function.
However, in view of the advances in through-put technology that enable more rapid identifica-
tion of genes and the “race” between companies to identify the functions of genes, the advan-
tages of disclosure may not be that substantial.257 They may be insufficient to warrant the broad
right granted to a patent holder to control all uses of the isolated gene for almost twenty years.
As described earlier, the sovereign enclosure regimes are deterring companies and research-
ers from bioprospecting in genetically rich countries.258 The emerging response of developing
countries to the low levels of such activity and the disappointing revenue flows and benefit-
sharing arrangements is to tighten their grip over genetic material even further by linking the
patent application or patent grant to compliance with their access-restricting regimes.259 One
can expect that companies and research institutions will avoid engaging in behavior that might
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imperil or encumber their ultimate ability to obtain a patent. Consequently, the emerging link-
age between the patent grant and the enforcement of access-restricting regimes will likely
further deter companies from prospecting in genetically rich developing countries. Companies
will also likely avoid interactions with scientists from developing countries for fear of facing accu-
sations of having obtained genetic resources in violation of national access-restricting regimes.
Companies and research institutions are coping by adopting strategies that will likely be con-
tinued in the future. Thus, rather than turning to nature for potentially valuable genes, they
have relied more heavily on ex situ collections;260 and in the face of increasingly restricted access
to raw genetic material, they have depended upon, searched for, and invested more heavily in
technological solutions to meet their needs. Such solutions include both combinatorial chem-
istry, which enables the building of “designer genes” from scratch through the assembling of
amino acids that make up genes,261 and the manipulation of genes within a species rather than
transferring them between species.262 Instead of inserting a frost-resistant gene from a unique
flounder into a tomato, scientists might manipulate the tomato’s existing genes to achieve frost
resistance. 
Despite their promise, technical advances or fixes do not eliminate the value of in situ natural
genetic material.263 Such material offers time-tested survival templates.264 Moreover, scientists
consistently report the continued value of natural resources and the need to return to nature for
new inputs.265 Thus, the minimization, and in many cases abandonment, of the search for and
use of natural genetic material in the wake of the enclosure regimes is harmful.
Finally, the present international norm of excessive enclosure of raw or little-improved genetic
material by either the private sector or sovereigns forgoes the benefits of more open systems.
Society benefits when certain places and goods, like thoroughfares, air, and information in the
public domain, are available to all.266 This holds particularly true when the resources in question,
like genes and language, are building blocks. If the building blocks themselves are not acces-
sible, people cannot build, and innovation is hampered. 
In the case of genetic material, the open system that predated the CBD had numerous advan-
tages. Samples of biological resources containing genetic material, such as seeds, soil, leaves, and
animals, were freely exchanged both within and between nations. This widespread interna-
tional sharing facilitated the conservation and improvement of genetic material, as well as fos-
tered international scientific collaboration. 
Some resources benefit from being shared, creating “a more, the merrier effect.”267 The more
the resources are shared, the more they are preserved. Genetic resources are this type of good.268
In contrast to engendering a tragedy of the commons, where a common resource is used to
depletion, the sharing of genetic material under an open system increases the global genetic
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pool, as it ensures the maintenance of genetic material in multiple locations.269 The open system
that predated the expansion of intellectual property rights and sovereign rights over genetic
material accounts for the widespread distribution and preservation of crops and crop varieties
away from their places of origin.270 The maintenance of genetic material in multiple countries
and locations has benefited all. For example, under the open system, grape seedlings from France
were brought to the United States.271 Later a blight destroyed many French vineyards and the
United States sent seedlings back to France.272 Just as the American wine industry bases itself
in part on grape seedlings from France, so the French wine industry bases itself in part on repa-
triated grape seedlings from the United States.
In addition, the open system produced ex situ international and national structures to con-
serve, share, and improve biological and genetic material. These included zoos and national
collections of plant and other material. Such collections have facilitated the conservation of
plants and animals as well as promoted research related to them. 
The work of the Consultative Group on International Agricultural Research (CGIAR) consti-
tutes an excellent example of the international conservation and collaborative activity that
flourished under the open system. The CGIAR system consists of sixteen international research
centers that hold and improve seed and other plant material collected from around the world.273
Its purpose is to collect, conserve, improve, and facilitate the worldwide sharing of plant genetic
resources for food and agriculture.274 Breeders can request samples of seeds from the CGIAR
system to breed crops that, for example, might resist a pest or blight, or use less water.275 It is
unlikely that as open a system of worldwide conservation and sharing of genetic material could
be created anew in the present international environment of hyperownership. Indeed, in the
aftermath of the CBD’s adoption, the challenge has been to preserve the CGIAR system.276
The open system facilitated not only the conservation of genetic material in multiple places,
but also the improvement of such material. For example, the semidwarf varieties of wheat and
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
672 THE AMERICAN JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol. 98:641
277 PRINGLE, supra note 249, at 32, 40.
278 Brush, supra note 269.
279 The difficulty of empirically proving the benefits of open systems over closed ones is a classic problem.
Despite the existence of patent laws for centuries, their comparative efficacy over public domain systems in pro-
moting innovation has yet to be empirically proven. See WORLD BANK, KNOWLEDGE FOR DEVELOPMENT—WORLD
DEVELOPMENT REPORT 1998/1999, at 34–35 (1999) (no systematic empirical evidence confirms the positive impact
of intellectual property rights on increasing research and development; and while tighter intellectual property
rights “may actually slow the overall pace of innovation,” systematic empirical evidence proving this is similarly
lacking); BOYLE, supra note 266 (pointing to lack of empirical proof that intellectual property rights in aggregate
increase the overall amount of innovation); Letter from Thomas Jefferson to Isaac McPherson (Aug. 13, 1813),
THOMAS JEFFERSON, WRITINGS 1286 (Merrill D. Peterson ed., 1984), available at <http://www.temple.edu/lawschool/
dpost/mcphersonletter.html> (noting that the lack of patent laws in other countries did not appear to reduce their
comparative ability to innovate).
280 Heller & Eisenberg, supra note 7; see Stone, supra note 52 (noting the general overvaluation of genetic
resources).
281 See notes 34–36, 45 supra and corresponding text.
282 See PEOPLE, PLANTS, AND PATENTS, supra note 274, at 93–94 (noting position that raw material provided
under the CGIAR system should be freely available only if improved varieties are made freely available); Odek,
supra note 34. This position was repeatedly taken by many developing countries during the renegotiation of the
International Undertaking on Plant Genetic Resources that took place between 1996 and 2001. (I participated
in the negotiations as legal counsel to the U.S. delegation and personally heard such proposals.)
rice that formed the bedrock of the Green Revolution were created from raw genetic material
freely obtained from Japan.277 These improved semidwarf varieties, in turn, were rapidly shared
throughout the world thanks to the open system, which prevailed at that time.278 Moreover, the
open system facilitated informal collaboration between scientists of different countries, who
could collaborate without having to clear their actions with national government authorities or
worry about infringing upon a range of patents. They could also pursue genetic research in
their own countries without navigating an extensive regulatory maze.
Notwithstanding its benefits, establishing a comprehensive open system for raw genetic mate-
rial, even if it could be proved empirically desirable,279 is unrealistic. Moreover, the present sys-
tem of excessive enclosure of genetic material is unlikely to self-correct or at least to do so readily.
First, too many believe that genetic material will produce windfall profits for developing coun-
tries or represent a justified reward for corporations. As Michael Heller and Rebecca Eisenberg
noted, drawing upon the literature of psychology, individuals and entities tend to overstate the
value of their contribution and such overstated beliefs are difficult to dislodge.280 Second,
groups, individuals, and interested civil society are unlikely to give up their right to control, or
to have input into decisions on, whether access to genetic material should be granted to ame-
liorate anticommons problems. Third, the memory of the colonial experience makes develop-
ing countries particularly wary of permitting the extraction of resources without compensation.
Fourth, in a time of declining foreign assistance budgets, tremendous pressure is being applied
to find alternative funding sources for developing countries. The prospect of genetic gold or
genetic petroleum may be too seductive to pass up entirely. 
Finally, the developing country reaction described earlier was not only a product of perceived
aggressive patenting in the genetics area, but also a response to the patenting of improved
genetic material that took place in the wake of Chakrabarty.281 If developed countries would place
improved genetic material in the public domain, developing countries have maintained that
they would completely open up access to raw genetic material within their borders.282 Devel-
oped countries are not about to exclude all bioengineered organisms and improved genetic
material from the patent grant, nor do I argue for such a step. Given this reality, implementa-
tion of a comprehensive open system for raw or little-improved genetic material is unrealistic
at present. 
To reach this conclusion does not mean that the international community should continue
to pursue the present-day hyperownership approach to genetic material. Rather, part V sug-
gests a framework of reciprocal intermediate steps to be taken by the United States and gene-
rich developing countries that would reduce both private and sovereign enclosure of genetic
material and move the global community toward a more open system. A thorough exploration
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of each prong of this framework is beyond the scope of this article, whose purpose is limited
to critically analyzing the current global situation of hyperownership over genetic material and
to proposing an overall framework for reform. 
V. A NOVEL FRAMEWORK FOR A MORE OPEN SYSTEM FOR GENETIC MATERIAL 
A Call for “International Regarding” in U.S. Patent Policy on Biotechnology
U.S. patent law and its implementation are not ossified. A rich body of scholarship and ongo-
ing debate have considered many aspects of the patent system. For example, scholars, Con-
gress, the Patent and Trademark Office, and the courts have grappled with the questions of what
ought to be patent-eligible subject matter,283 how strictly or liberally to apply the requirements
of patentability,284 and what exceptions should be made to the patent grant.285 The debate as
to where and how the lines for patenting should be drawn has been particularly acute with
respect to genetic material, and the system is still struggling to clarify the relevant ground rules.286
The determination by Congress, the PTO, and to a lesser degree the courts of whether, under
what circumstances, and to what extent patents should be granted often has a policy compo-
nent.287 The touchstone for such policy determinations is whether and how patents will en-
courage or discourage innovation.288 This touchstone flows from the utilitarian nature of patent
law. As widely agreed, patents are granted to encourage innovation and should be granted only
to the extent necessary to achieve that end.289 Scholars and decision makers have at times con-
sidered various factors when ascertaining whether patents in certain areas encourage innova-
tion. These include whether the particular area of innovation involves high research and develop-
ment costs, the ease of imitation, and the availability of alternative incentives for innovation.290
This section argues that policy determinations on the patenting of genetic material in the
United States should include an “international regarding” component, meaning that Congress,
the PTO, and/or the courts should take into account the reaction of other countries when
deciding as a policy matter whether to expand or restrict patent rights over genetic material
in the United States.291 They should consider the impact of this international reaction upon
innovation.292 At present, a vigorous discussion is being waged in the patent literature as to
whether the PTO, Congress, or the courts serve as the best forum to air and act upon policy and
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innovation considerations that bear on line drawing in the patent law area.293 The Federal Cir-
cuit, which adjudicates patent cases, has shied away from expressly considering policy factors
in its decisions.294 Nonetheless, it has set different standards for patenting in the biotechnology
area than in the software and mechanical areas.295 The scope of this article does not extend to
determining which branch of government is best suited for this function; rather, it seeks to add
the international regarding dimension to the list of policy and innovation factors that merit
consideration in patenting-policy decisions. The discussion below does offer examples of how
each branch of government could take the reactions of other countries into account in this re-
gard. Overall, inclusion of the international regarding component favors steps to create a more
open system for genetic material. 
The United States has spent considerable energy in pressing developing countries to pro-
mulgate patent systems similar to its own system.296 Through the TRIPS Agreement, the United
States has essentially required developing countries to protect U.S. biotechnological (and other)
innovation and to internalize U.S. values and concerns.297 Yet the United States has failed to
acknowledge developing country concerns and the implications of such concerns for innovation
in the interpretation and evolution of U.S. patent law. The policy discussion within the PTO,
Congress, and, to the extent it takes place, the courts on whether, when, and to what extent the
United States should extend patents to genetic material is largely an insular exercise.298 Similarly,
the ever-increasing body of literature questioning aspects of genomic patenting and proposing
all sorts of interventions usually fails to take into account the reactions of other countries to U.S.
line drawing in the genetics area.299 To the extent that this literature references other countries’
approaches or concerns, it tends to be limited to consideration of how other developed countries,
particularly members of the European Union, treat genetic material, or addresses the different
issue of whether U.S. policies and proposed interventions comply with the TRIPS Agreement.300
This omission is problematic because where the United States draws its lines with respect to
the patenting of genetic material has repercussions on the availability of raw genetic material that
contributes to biotechnological innovation. As explained earlier, enclosure of genetic material
by the United States, particularly when it has been little improved, begets enclosure of raw genetic
material by developing countries. The easier it is to patent genes in the United States, the harder
it will be to obtain genetic samples that contribute to biotechnological innovation from genet-
ically rich source countries. Because raw genetic material contributes to innovation, responsive
enclosure by sovereigns to the liberal patenting of genetic material by the United States is likely
to hinder innovation or at least cause it to rest at a suboptimal level.
Moreover, where the United States draws its lines with respect to the patenting of genetic mate-
rial affects the general climate for scientific cooperation between developed and developing
countries. Overall, liberal patenting of genetic material in the United States makes it more dif-
ficult for U.S. scientists to collaborate with scientists in developing countries. Enclosure laws in
developing countries, promulgated in large part in response to the patenting of genetic material
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in the United States, affect the ability of scientists in those countries to share information and
material related to biotechnological innovation with U.S. scientists without obtaining govern-
ment consent and arranging benefit-sharing agreements.301 
The recent seven-year international exercise to renegotiate the International Undertaking
for Plant Genetic Resources to promote global food security illustrates this problem. During the
renegotiation of the Undertaking, developing countries repeatedly criticized the patenting of
little-improved genetic material in the United States.302 They asserted unwillingness to share
genetic material from their countries and even objected to the sharing of genetic material held
in international agricultural research centers, on the ground that such material, once shared,
would be patented or “fenced in” by developed countries, especially the United States.303
Inclusion of an international regarding calculus when shaping patent law comports with the
widely acknowledged utilitarian purpose of the patent system.304 Its omission is inconsistent
with that purpose. Any policy analysis into the innovative character of genetic patenting, and how
standards for such patenting should be set and construed to maximize innovation, that omits the
transnational variable as part of its calculus will yield incomplete and suboptimal conclusions.
The justification for patenting isolated genes is to encourage the identification and disclosure
of their functions.305 Yet some of that allegedly innovation-promoting effect is offset by the re-
sponsive curtailment by source countries of access to a wealth of raw and, at times, unique genetic
material that contributes to innovation in both genetics and biotechnology. While granting
patents to little-improved genetic material might promote the discovery and disclosure of the func-
tions of some genes in the short term, it may impede overall biotechnological innovation in the
long run as researchers find themselves unable to obtain valuable genetic material in the wild.
How would the international regarding calculus that I propose work? I am not suggesting that
patent examiners assess the foreign response to each and every patent application, or that fed-
eral courts entertain a host of potential foreign implications when adjudicating a wide range
of patent infringement cases. An international regarding calculus would operate at the policy or
line-drawing level. It should be included in the mix of factors to be taken into account and bal-
anced against each other when making these policy determinations.306 
For example, the Patent and Trademark Office could take international implications into
account when exercising its discretion in setting the guidelines for patent examiners regarding
genetic material.307 The PTO’s recent revision of the utility guidelines that it applies to biotech-
nological innovations and the attendant academic discourse illustrate the insularity of U.S. line-
drawing activity, as well as demonstrate how international implications could have been consid-
ered. The granting by the PTO of patents to isolated naturally occurring genetic material where
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the “inventor” had failed to identify a specific utility for that gene or gene fragment (so-called
express sequence tags, or ESTs, which essentially serve as a research probe for the rest of the gene)
generated considerable criticism.308 That criticism alleged that the PTO had set the standard for
utility too low in the genetic patenting area.309 The PTO, critics argued, was issuing patents to
genetic fragments or genes of little or no demonstrated use and such patents would chill research.310
Interestingly, the extensive criticism leveled in the U.S. legal literature against a low utility bar
and its innovation-inhibiting side effects did not reference international or transnational consid-
erations that bolster these concerns.311 In particular, it ignored the general hostility of source
countries to the patenting of little-improved genetic material and the growing reaction engen-
dered by that hostility.312 
In response to this extensive criticism, the PTO revised the utility guidelines that it applies to
the biotechnology area.313 It posted interim guidelines in 1999 and received numerous com-
ments on them.314 Several comments reflected developing country concerns over the patenting
of genes and genetic sequences.315 Most specifically, one commentator argued that the PTO
should not grant patents to ESTs because “it will exacerbate tensions between indigenous peo-
ples and western academic/research communities and because it will undermine indigenous
peoples’ own research and academic institutions.”316 The PTO summarily rejected this comment,
stating that “[u]nder United States law, a patent applicant is entitled to a patent when an inven-
tion meets the patentability criteria of title 35.”317 Other commentators raised the oft-mentioned
objection of developing countries that genes are products of nature or in the alternative discov-
eries, which should not be eligible for patenting.318 This objection was similarly brushed aside.
Obviously, the PTO administers U.S. law, but it enjoys a certain amount of latitude in inter-
preting and applying that law.319 The PTO’s discretion involves interpreting the statutory require-
ments for patentability of “utility,” “novelty,” and “nonobviousness.” The legal literature that tries
to shape these decisions focuses on the impact that a given line or standard will have on inno-
vation.320 The promulgation of new utility guidelines, in response to domestic criticism that the
PTO was issuing patents for genetic sequences too liberally, which would deter rather than pro-
mote innovation, reflects this latitude. The United States engaged in a public discourse on where
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and how the lines should be drawn. That discourse, however, largely ignored or glibly closed the
door to developing country concerns that bear on this line drawing, which it did not have to
do. Arguments that granting patents to genes with little identified function deters innovation
were bolstered by the contribution of such patents to a reciprocal spiral of increased enclosure
of raw genetic material, also inhibiting innovation.321 
Similarly, Congress could and should take the reactions of other countries into account when
deciding whether and how to amend the patent statutes with respect to biotechnological inno-
vations. Burk and Lemley point out that “[w]hile patent law has historically been uniform, with
a single set of legal standards” to cover all types of innovation, Congress has increasingly demon-
strated a willingness to tailor the law to meet the needs of particular industries.322 Scholars have
suggested numerous ways of tailoring the patent law to loosen or restrict standards in the bio-
technology area.323 These include proposals to relax the disclosure requirements or nonobvi-
ousness standards that apply to such patents or to restrict the scope of genetic sequence pat-
ents.324 In fact, in 1995 Congress, ostensibly in an effort to help the biotechnology industry, low-
ered the nonobviousness bar for biotechnological processes,325 making it easier to patent them.
The merits of proposals to amend the patent statute and the compatibility of such proposals
with the TRIPS Agreement are subject to debate.326 However, should Congress again consider
enacting biotechnology-specific legislation, it should take into account the likely reactions of
other countries to such legislation. In particular, legislation that makes it easier to patent genetic
material, especially little-improved genetic material, could fuel responsive enclosure by sover-
eigns over genetic material in their countries.
Like the PTO, courts have a certain amount of discretion in interpreting the words “utility,”
“nonobviousness,” and “novelty.” In addition, the courts, particularly the Supreme Court, serve
as the primary arbiter of whether or not something constitutes a discovery of nature, which
cannot be patented.327 The U.S. patent statute gives little guidance with respect to the latter
inquiry. In determining whether a gene constitutes an innovation or a discovery of a product
of nature, courts could consider how other countries view this issue. They might also consider
the extent to which other countries require improvement to an isolated gene when determining
whether that gene overcomes the nonobviousness or utility hurdle. While the views of others
should not necessarily be determinative,328 they need not be ignored. They could perform a useful
role in helping U.S. courts reach the best decision. Several Supreme Court justices have pointed to
the benefits of considering the conclusions reached by other countries on issues similar to those
confronted by the Court.329 Justice Stephen Breyer, pointing to the human rights area, noted
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that it is especially beneficial when different countries apply somewhat similar legal phrases to
somewhat similar circumstances.330 Given the increasingly global nature of patent law by virtue
of the TRIPS Agreement, which essentially internationalizes concepts of novelty, utility, and
nonobviousness, consideration of other countries’ approaches seems particularly appropriate.
Its appropriateness is bolstered by the increasing international trade in patented goods and
the tensions that can arise when an item is allowed to be patented in one country but not in
another.331 
What are the overall implications of an international regarding calculus for the patenting of
genetic material? Let us consider two of the issues currently debated in the academic literature.
The first involves the question mentioned in the preceding paragraph, whether patent rights
should extend to little-improved genetic material or more generally to what some are calling
discoveries close to the lab bench.332 Some argue that patents should not be granted for little-
improved genetic material, as it constitutes a discovery of nature.333 Discoveries of nature, like
Einstein’s theory of relativity or the discovery of a plant or mineral, have traditionally been ex-
cluded from patent protection. Linda Demaine and Aaron Fellmeth argue that for a gene to war-
rant a patent, the inventor ought to have substantially improved it.334 Isolating and purifying
the gene and identifying its function are not enough. Those taking the opposite position argue
that patents serve a useful role in encouraging the isolation and purification of genes into a
useful form.335 They further argue that patents have been granted for the isolation of chemical
compounds, and that genes are simply a type of chemical compound.336 
Some, while believing that the United States has issued patents over genetic material too lib-
erally, are not prepared to go as far as Demaine and Fellmeth. They support the patenting of
isolated genes, provided that the function of the gene has been identified so that the utility
requirement is satisfied and the isolation and identification of the gene’s function are not obvious
in light of the prior art.337 They would thus find naturally occurring genes eligible for patenting
but argue for strict, rather than liberal, application of the patentability requirements of utility
and nonobviousness.338
When one takes into account the international consequences of such line-drawing determina-
tions, they argue against allowing the patenting of little-improved genetic material. In the
alternative, they favor strict construction of the patent requirements in genetics, particularly
with respect to utility and nonobviousness. First, the majority of countries in the world do not
agree with the U.S. standards for the patenting of little-improved genetic material, finding them
too lax. Many consider such material more akin to discoveries or products of nature.339 Other
developed countries, like the EU members and Japan, while permitting the patenting of genetic
material, exempt from patent infringement experimental uses of such material, allow for the
denial of this kind of patent on public policy grounds in certain situations, and apply slightly
stricter patentability requirements.340 Second, liberal patenting requirements in the United States,
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which essentially enable greater private enclosure of genetic material, engender reciprocal en-
closure of raw genetic material by sovereigns in gene-rich countries. To the argument that too
many patents in upstream genetic materials deter innovation because researchers cannot use
these discoveries for downstream applications,341 an international regarding component adds
that too many patents on upstream materials further deter innovation because the developing
countries retaliate by making it difficult for researchers in the United States to obtain the raw
genetic material that contributes to innovation.
International regarding also has some bearing on whether Congress should enact a broader
experimental use exemption than currently allowed for genetic innovations in particular, or
for research in general.342 Such an exemption would allow researchers to use patented genetic
material, including substantially improved genetic material, freely for research.343 It could ame-
liorate some of the anticommons problems that currently stymie research in the United States.
To these benefits, international regarding would add the benefit of enabling U.S. researchers to
collaborate more easily with scientists overseas. Moreover, such an exemption could modestly
improve the climate for a more open system for genetic material internationally. Genetically
rich countries might respond to a broader experimental use exemption by similarly exempting
research uses of raw genetic material from their enclosure regimes. Some already do so.
Congress and the U.S. Supreme Court have considered the approaches of other countries and
the implications of those approaches when making certain decisions regarding the scope of
intellectual property rights under U.S. law. In Eldred v. Ashcroft, the Supreme Court found that
Congress’s expansion of the copyright term by twenty years did not violate the constitutional
restriction of those terms to “limited periods of time.” According to the Court, Congress had not
exceeded its constitutional authority by enacting the extension in part because it was seeking
to harmonize U.S. copyright terms with those of the European Union.344 If consideration of
other countries’ practices favors broader intellectual property rights in some cases, so do such
practices, views, and their implications favor narrower construction of those rights in others. For
the reasons mentioned above, genetic patenting appears to be such an area.
Overall, adding an international regarding component to the mix of factors that are consid-
ered for genomic patenting (1) lends support to construing the isolation and identification of
genetic material as products of nature rather than patent-eligible subject matter, (2) supports high-
utility and nonobviousness standards in the biotechnology field, and (3) supports an experimental
use exemption. It generally favors the creation of a more open system for genetic material. 
Were the practice of patenting isolated and identified genetic material stopped, the motivation
of developing countries to assert commensurate ownership rights over raw genetic material in
their countries would decrease. While such actions would not eliminate all the reasons that caused
sovereigns to assert ownership rights over raw genetic material, they would create a more fertile
environment for enhancing access to it. 
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Reducing Sovereign Enclosure of Genetic Material
As stated earlier, internationally, the appropriateness and desirability of sovereign ownership
or extensive control of raw genetic material represents the prevailing wisdom. However, just
as fluidity can be found in the patent system vis-à-vis how much and under what circumstances
patents should extend to genetic material, so, too, can fluidity be found in the international
system vis-à-vis how much control sovereigns should extend over raw genetic material and
under what circumstances. Many nations have already adopted laws and rules governing access
to genetic material within their borders, but even more are doing so. In addition, debate and
the implementation of guidelines on access and benefit sharing regarding genetic material are
taking place under the auspices of the Convention on Biological Diversity.345 The meaning of the
CBD’s terms and the manner of their implementation are evolving.346 Opportunity therefore
exists for shaping the laws, rules, and guidelines that define sovereign enclosure of raw genetic
material.
As discussed earlier, establishment of a comprehensive open system for raw genetic material
is not realistic; but that does not mean the international community should continue to pursue
an aggressive sovereignty approach. Instead, this article suggests three intermediate steps that
would reduce sovereign enclosure of raw genetic material and move the global community toward
a more open system for such material. The first step would flip the current normative assump-
tion of enclosure with nonenclosure as the exception, to a norm of nonenclosure with sovereign
enclosure as the exception. The second step involves two key considerations for determining
when sovereign enclosure is more justifiable and when less so. The third step calls for a shift in
sovereign focus from stressing the obtainment by developing countries of remuneration for raw
genetic material to stressing their opportunities to add value to such material.
A flip in the normative assumption of sovereign enclosure. The first step would reverse the norma-
tive assumption with respect to sovereign enclosure of genetic material. Today, the global com-
munity begins with the assumption of enclosure347 and has to justify nonenclosure. This norm
is reflected in Article 15(7) of the CBD, which requires the prior informed consent of the source
country, unless it provides otherwise. The recent negotiation of the International Treaty on
Plant Genetic Resources for Food and Agriculture exemplifies this current state. Nations began
their discussion of access to these resources for food and agriculture by broadly asserting state
sovereignty over them.348 Having done so, they then spent seven grueling years developing dis-
tinct carve-outs for a more open system.349 Enclosure is the rule. Access is the exception. 
Instead, nations and international work addressing access to genetic material should begin
with the normative assumption of an open system and then justify sovereign ownership or en-
closure.350 In this respect, such a system of sovereign enclosure would resemble the patent sys-
tem. Despite its excesses, the patent system assumes that most information falls within the pub-
lic domain. Those seeking a patent have to justify enclosure by proving that they have met the
requirements of novelty, nonobviousness or inventiveness, and utility.351 They must also disclose
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their innovation to the public.352 In addition, unlike sovereign ownership rights, the patent grant
is of limited duration so that, after a prescribed period of time, the innovation enters the public
domain.353 Admittedly, the bar for patenting raw or little-improved genetic material has been set
too low, and this author and others believe that such patents have been granted wrongly.354 How-
ever, the debate over whether, under what circumstances, and to what extent a patent should
apply to genetic material operates within a system that makes the applicant justify enclosure
against an overall ethos of openness or public domain.355 This is an appropriate starting point
for sovereigns as they confront the as-yet untapped, and to a large extent unidentified, value
of the genetic resources within their borders. 
When sovereign enclosure is justifiable and when it is less so. Were a flip in the normative assumption
adopted, the question of what circumstances would or would not justify sovereign enclosure or
ownership would become more pronounced. What is enclosed? What remains open? This ques-
tion brings us to the second part of my proposed approach: two key considerations to determine
when sovereign enclosure is more justifiable and when it is less so.
The first consideration would avoid, to the extent possible, the balkanization of property
interests in a given res. It would argue against the assertion of a sovereign ownership interest
distinct from the ownership interest of the tangible property that houses the genetic material in
question. Under this consideration, the owner of a frog would own that particular frog’s genetic
material. Thus, the frog’s owner could freely alienate that frog and its genes as he or she pleases.
The owner would not have to obtain the national government’s consent or remit a portion of any
proceeds to the government as compensation for its ownership interest in the frog’s genetic make-
up. Similarly, the owner could refuse to alienate the frog or its genetic material without raising
the prospect of being seen as obstructing the sovereign’s ownership interest in that material.
The same would hold true for property interests secured by indigenous communities, which
have struggled and continue to struggle for rights over land and resources.356 In some cases they
have succeeded in obtaining such rights. Canada, for example, recently decided to vest indig-
enous groups with considerable natural resources.357 To the extent that an indigenous commu-
nity obtains such rights, they should not be encumbered by the national sovereign’s assertion
of a residual or newly imposed ownership interest in the genetic component of those resources.
Under the nonbalkanization approach, an indigenous community would enjoy the same right
to alienate or to object to the alienation of the genetic component of its resources as it has to
alienate the resource that contains that material. A nonbalkanization approach would eliminate
the risks to human autonomy and dignity discussed earlier. It would also reduce, if not eliminate,
anticommons pressure by vesting the owner of the resource that houses the genetic material
with full ownership rights over the genetic component of the resource and the commensurate
right to consent to its extraction. 
Before the adoption of the Convention on Biological Diversity, scholars engaged in debate over
who should own raw genetic material. Some argued that ownership should vest with sovereigns
as being in the best position to negotiate lucrative deals for raw genetic material.358 It was further
argued that, if sovereigns owned genetic material, they would have an incentive to conserve it.359
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Others contended that indigenous communities should own genetic material, as they were the
ones who had traditionally conserved it.360 Still others believed that individuals should own ge-
netic material.361 Not surprisingly, when sovereigns negotiated the answer to this question inter-
nationally, they effectively claimed the ownership interest or its core right—the right to exclude—
for themselves. This article suggests that the answer to the question of ownership of raw genetic
material should have been: whoever owns the res that contains the genetic material. The owner
will differ in different situations. 
Applying the nonbalkanization consideration, sovereign enclosure would be justified where
the sovereign owns the tangible property that houses the genetic material. Public parks exem-
plify this situation. Because of their pristine or special nature, these areas are likely to contain
unique genetic material. The discovery in Yellowstone National Park of thermus aquaticus, a heat-
resistant bacterium with extensive commercial application, serves as an example.362 In addition,
bioprospecting in national parks, in comparison to other areas, is less likely to raise anticom-
mons and individual autonomy problems. Because the national government owns the park and
its resources, multiple consents need not be secured. Similarly, alienating resources in such a
situation would not ordinarily infringe on the rights of individuals or indigenous communities,
as they do not have an ownership interest in the property that houses the material.363 Moreover,
given the nexus between the bioprospecting activity and the park, sums received from that
activity might have a greater chance of being used for conservation connected with the park
or with a national system of protected areas than sums received from bioprospecting that is
unconnected with an established conservation effort.364 
If national governments marketed their parks or public lands for their bioprospecting poten-
tial, these sites should appeal to commercial concerns. In view of the lack of overlapping multiple
ownership interests, they would offer the advantage of uncontested property rights to the genetic
material obtained. By the same token, they should involve a lesser administrative burden than
prospecting on nongovernment land. Indeed, if national access regimes sought to facilitate
bioprospecting in national parks and on public land, they could create an attractive alternative
to the regulatory maze that currently deters corporations from venturing into many countries.
Both the United States and Costa Rica have successfully adopted such an approach. The Diversa
Corporation entered into an agreement with the U.S. National Park Service to prospect in
Yellowstone National Park.365 Costa Rica has entered into multiple agreements with corporations
to provide them with genetic samples taken exclusively from public lands.366 
A second consideration in determining the justifiability of sovereign enclosure would involve
an assessment of the likely economic benefits and costs of an access-restricting regime. For
example, in deciding how much genetic material to enclose, governments would assess the abun-
dance of a genetic resource or class of genetic resources. Governments ought not to waste scarce
regulatory and enforcement resources in attempting to capture the value of genetic material
available in multiple countries. The numerous sources of supply decrease the likelihood that
provision of such material will prove lucrative. In addition, enforcement problems can be ex-
pected to prove more difficult, as any given genetic sample could have come from a multitude
of countries. Finally, conflicts between countries are likely to arise over identification of the source
country of the various genes. In contrast, sovereign enclosure would be more justified where
the country is home to unique or rare genetic material. As with all genetic material, while the
http://law.bepress.com/rutgersnewarklwps/art15
2004] HYPEROWNERSHIP IN A TIME OF BIOTECHNOLOGICAL PROMISE 683
367 Brush, supra note 269, at 135 (agricultural bioengineered products are less profitable than bioengineered
organisms in the pharmaceutical and chemical industries); Fowler, supra note 16, at 487.
368 See, e.g., Fowler, supra note 16, at 487.
369 The PGR Treaty, supra note 57, creates a more open system for plant genetic resources for core staple crops
for food and agriculture. This model may warrant repetition in other areas, such as some human genetic resources.
370 Malaysia has a strong federal system comprising thirteen states, each with its own legislature and extensive
powers over natural resources. KERRY TEN KATE & ADRIAN WELLS, BENEFIT-SHARING CASE STUDY: THE ACCESS AND
BENEFIT-SHARING POLICIES OF THE UNITED STATES NATIONAL CANCER INSTITUTE: A COMPARATIVE ACCOUNT
OF THE DISCOVERY AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE DRUGS CALANOLIDE AND TOPOTECAN 18 (1998). Access to genetic
resources within Malaysia is regulated as much by the states as by the federal government. Bioprospecting activities
in Malaysia will often require both federal and state approval. See generally id. at 18–20.
371 Forests Ordinance of Apr. 1994, §65A(b), reprinted in TEN KATE & WELLS, supra note 370, at 19 n.50.
372 TEN KATE & WELLS, supra note 370, at 20; Stone, supra note 51, at 992 (discussing uncertainty of determin-
ing which gene will prove valuable). He does not propose a comprehensive approach.
373 TEN KATE & WELLS, supra note 370, at 20 (suggesting that observers have made such criticism). 
374 Id. at 19–20 (quoting the proposed amendment). The proposal under consideration remains somewhat tai-
lored in that it excludes plants and microbial genetic resources from its scope. Id. It also applies only to foreigners.
likelihood is slim that unique or rare material would yield a commercially lucrative product, at
least any value derived from it would not be further eroded by the presence of multiple suppliers
or conflicting claims and contests between nations.
Similarly, governments should assess the suitability of certain classes of genetic material for
enclosure. For example, access to plant germ plasm for food and agriculture has traditionally
yielded rather low returns.367 Many have said that the costs of regulating access, in terms both of
the creation of a regulatory system and of the opportunity cost of less innovation in developing
new foods, exceed the potential proceeds from any access regime over agricultural genetic re-
sources.368 Such genetic material, therefore, does not appear particularly well suited to enclosure.369
This consideration represents a tailored or selective approach to enclosure. Malaysia has adopted
such an approach. In 1994 one of Malaysia’s states, Sarawak,370 passed legislation requiring
written authorization from the director of forests before the removal of any tree or extract from
a tree from Sarawak for research aimed at developing pharmaceutical or medicinal compounds.371
This legislation adopted an uncommonly tailored approach. It covers only trees and then only
with respect to their use in pharmaceutical or medicinal compounds. 
A selective or tailored approach has usually not been favored on the grounds that one can never
anticipate for certain which gene might prove valuable.372 Thus, observers have criticized Malay-
sia’s tailored approach.373 This criticism has apparently led, at least in part, to consideration
by Malaysia’s national government of broader national legislation that would require bio-
prospectors to obtain a national government license for “all activities relating to prospecting,
collection, research, utilisation and development of genetic resources.”374 At present, the pre-
vailing response to uncertainty is to control or enclose most genetic material. Such an approach,
however, does not take into account the administrative cost of omnibus control. Similarly, it
fails to take into account the chilling effect of comprehensive regimes on informal exchanges
between local and foreign scientists. While a selective approach would leave some genetic mate-
rial that might ultimately prove valuable unenclosed, it would enable more successful regula-
tion of access to the genetic material that is enclosed.
Would a selective approach address the anticommons and human autonomy risks that I have
raised? It would not rectify these problems directly, but it might do so indirectly. If a government
enclosed less, it would reduce the administrative burden of total enclosure and enable it to hus-
band and focus its administrative and enforcement resources. It could do a better job of creating
a system where the consent of material stakeholders is efficiently secured before a bioprospect-
ing project goes forward. Moreover, because selective regimes would target the resources most
likely, though not certain, to hold value, they might attract bioprospecting projects that are more
lucrative, hence better able to support the costs of securing the consent of multiple stakeholders.
Tailored, efficient systems would probably do a better job of attracting bioprospecting projects
than the omnibus, burdensome systems currently in place and under way. In addition, because
under a selective approach the national government would enclose less genetic material, a smaller
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universe of material and stakeholders would face anticommons and human autonomy and
dignity problems. The problems, in short, would exist under a selective approach but to a lesser
extent than under the prevailing comprehensive enclosure systems.
Value-added approach. The third step of my proposed approach involves a change in focus by
national governments and the international community from one that stresses the obtainment
of remuneration by developing countries for genetic material in its raw state to one that stresses
opportunities for developing countries to add value to such material. Conceptually, this change
in focus would be patterned not on a model of an export commodity like petroleum but, rather,
on a value-added industry such as eco-tourism. Eco-tourism has enabled countries to generate
revenue in connection with the preservation of natural resources. It represents perhaps the best
example of the sustainable use of natural resources, whereby countries generate revenue from
nature without destroying it. To attract tourists, nations must conserve the natural environment
that the tourists come to enjoy. They generate revenue by providing value-added services in con-
nection with the tourist industry, ranging from lodging, to transportation, food, entertainment,
and guides. Eco-tourism requires countries to take a proactive approach, as they must develop
and provide infrastructure and services for the tourist industry, as well as market their country
as an eco-tourist destination. 
Several commentators have noted the benefits of value-added approaches to bioprospecting.375
Under these approaches, source countries do not obtain remuneration simply by providing
access to raw genetic material. Rather, they provide services in connection with such material
or otherwise add value to it.376 For example, a source country or an institution in that country
can add value to raw genetic material by offering assaying services for such material. 
Costa Rica is the country must often cited for the successful regulation of access to genetic
material.377 In contrast to most gene-rich developing countries, Costa Rica has concluded mul-
tiple benefit-sharing arrangements with corporations. It has adopted a value-added approach
to genetic material and created a national organization, INBIO, to provide initial assaying ser-
vices for raw genetic material. Under benefit-sharing arrangements with corporations like Merck
and Diversa, the corporations make lump-sum up-front payments to INBIO and agree to pay
royalties in the event a downstream product is developed. INBIO, rather than the corporations
or their agents, searches for potentially valuable genetic material and gives the corporations a
selection of such material. Costa Rica’s approach also includes the nonbalkanization model, as
INBIO conducts its bioprospecting solely on public lands where genetic material is not subject
to multiple ownership rights.378 Following the value-added model of eco-tourism rather than the
commodity export model of oil, Costa Rica has successfully and affirmatively marketed itself
as an attractive place to obtain assayed genetic material.379
INBIO’s agreement with Merck is the most heralded and often-cited bioprospecting agree-
ment.380 It was concluded prior to the adoption of the CBD and inspired countries to include
terms on access to genetic resources in the Convention, as it served as the primary example of
the value of genetic resources and their money-making potential.381 Unfortunately, the subtler
aspects of the Costa Rican approach, which stress adding value to raw genetic material and lim-
iting collection to public lands, are not reflected in the CBD or the numerous national laws that
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have emerged in its wake. Rather, both the CBD and the laws that it inspired are based on the
faulty assumption that genes are a resource like oil, which can and should be comprehensively
controlled to generate windfall profits. The framework proposed above argues against this
assumption and suggests a set of concrete steps for considerably narrower sovereign enclosure
of genetic material. 
VI. CONCLUSION 
Both the patent system and the sovereign-based system have overreached in permitting or
asserting ownership rights to genetic material. This article has shown that the sovereign-based
system (1) is or risks creating an anticommons in raw genetic material, (2) threatens the liberty
and autonomy of individuals and indigenous communities whose property contains such mate-
rial, and (3) is premised on a flawed approach in international law leading to broad and unen-
forceable regimes that will increase tensions between developed and developing nations and
may set off a major TRIPS dispute. Meanwhile, the overprivatization of genetic material through
the patent system is or, at a minimum, risks creating an anticommons in genetic material that
inhibits innovation.
 These twin systems of hyperownership interact in a corrosive fashion. Sovereigns, in response
to the patenting of genetic material, have been enclosing genetic material. Corporations and
research institutions, in turn, are avoiding potentially valuable bioprospecting opportunities or
pursuing such opportunities at suboptimal levels. In response, developing countries are tight-
ening their control over genetic material by using the patent system to enforce their access-
restricting regimes. This article predicts that corporations and research institutions will further
avoid interactions with genetically rich countries.
This reciprocal spiral of increased enclosure of genetic material hinders the eventual enjoy-
ment, by citizens of both economically developing and developed nations, of the as-yet largely
unrealized potential of these resources. It generates tensions between nations and threatens
individuals and indigenous communities. It diminishes opportunities to conserve, expand, and
improve the global genetic pool.
To repair this situation, this article has suggested a bilateral framework of steps to be taken
by the United States and by gene-rich developing countries that would reduce both private and
sovereign enclosure of genetic material and create a more open system. It proposes that the
United States take into account or internationally regard the adverse reaction of other coun-
tries, particularly developing countries that are rich in genetic diversity, when determining as
a utilitarian matter whether and, if so, to what extent to allow patents for genetic material.
Expansive patent rights can ultimately cause innovation in the biotechnology field to fall to
suboptimal levels because they cause sovereigns in the world’s most genetically diverse nations
to curtail access to the raw genetic material that contributes to such innovation. Application of an
international regarding calculus therefore argues for measures to limit the patenting of genetic
material and thus to create a more open system for such material. 
For their part, gene-rich developing countries and those engaged in international work
involving access to genetic resources should take steps to reduce sovereign enclosure of genetic
material. First, they should change their normative assumption of sovereign enclosure and
nonenclosure as an exception, to the reverse. Second, they should avoid severing the ownership
interest in genetic material from the ownership interest in the property containing the material
and should adopt more selective approaches to enclosure. Third, they should focus on value-
added approaches to enable their countries to benefit from genetic material.
The earlier paradigm in international law, an open system in which genetic resources were
readily shared by all and exclusively owned by no one, while far from perfect, was not without
its advantages. Rather than continuing their companion hyperownership approaches, developed
and developing countries, as well as those conducting international work on genetic resources
issues, should strive to achieve a more open system.
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